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325 
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N V. 
GARVEY1  NARROWS THE JUDICIAL STRIKE 
ZONE OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 
“Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise 
whenever you can . . . the nominal winner is often a real loser in fees, 
in expenses, and waste of time.”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the cost to litigate a claim has risen and the amount of time 
required for final adjudication of a claim has become longer, parties who 
enter contractual relationships have begun to engage in alternative 
methods of dispute resolution.3  One of the most commonly chosen 
techniques of alternative dispute resolution4 is arbitration.5 
Arbitration is most commonly utilized in the labor employment 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001). 
 2. Abraham Lincoln, Notes for a Law Lecture, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN (Roy P. Basler & Christian O. Basler eds.,  1990), http://showcase.netins.net/ 
web/creative/lincoln/speeches/lawlect.htm.  Even in 1850, Abraham Lincoln seemed to recognize 
the need for alternatives to litigation.  Id. 
 3. Kenneth M. Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337, 338 (2000) (discussing attempts 
by contracting parties to expand or limit judicial review of arbitration awards and the corresponding 
public policy considerations). 
 4. Id. at 338.  Arbitration is becoming a popular means of dispute resolution for parties in 
many different arenas.  Curtis D. Brown, Arbitration: It’s Not Just for Baseball Players Anymore, at 
http://expertpages.com/news/arbitration_baseball.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2002).  For example, 
companies have added arbitration clauses to customer accounts, using it as means of quick and 
cheap resolution for collecting on delinquent accounts.  Id.  Also, consumers are utilizing arbitration 
to solve disputes over faulty products and services.  Id.  As arbitration is expanding into many 
different settings, the majority of the adults in the United States say they would choose arbitration 
over filing a lawsuit to resolve a dispute.  American Financial Services Association, Lenders Adopt 
Voluntary Standard on Arbitration Agreements, at http://www.afsaonline.org/news/docs/ 
ArbitrationAgreements_June2000.docs (last visited Dec. 17, 2002) (stating that when adults are 
informed of the cost difference between arbitration and traditional lawsuits, eighty-two percent 
would opt for arbitration). 
 5. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “arbitration” as “a method of 
dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties who are usu[ally] agreed to by the 
disputing parties and whose decision is binding”). 
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arena for resolving disputes under a collective bargaining agreement.6  
The majority of collective bargaining agreements contain provisions for 
some form of grievance7 procedure to resolve disputes that arise from 
the application and interpretation of the agreement.8  Although parties to 
a collective bargaining agreement do not have to include an arbitration 
clause, its inclusion can serve purposes valuable both to the employer 
and to the employee.9 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 6. Joseph F. Tremiti, Misco and the Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Awards: No Longer a 
House Divided?, 14 U. DAYTON L. REV 279, 279 (1989) (discussing public policy grounds for 
vacating arbitration awards and the vagueness of the exception as articulated by the Supreme Court 
in prior holdings).  Collective bargaining agreements usually govern the relationship between labor 
unions and management. Gregory T. Mayes, The Third Circuit Defines the Public Policy Exception 
to Labor Arbitration Awards – Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 993 F.2d 357 (3d 
Cir. 1993), 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 493, 493 (1994) (discussing Third Circuit’s application and 
formulation of the public policy exception for vacating arbitration awards).  A collective bargaining 
agreement is negotiated and entered into by the labor union (on behalf of the employees) and the 
management.  Id.  These agreements cover a wide variety of subjects, including wages, hours, lay-
offs, discipline, working conditions, health and accident insurance, retirement, pensions, and 
promotions.  See also Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 
1490 (1959) (discussing the limits of the judicial function in suits to compel performance of an 
agreement to arbitrate grievances).  For a basic overview of collective bargaining agreements, see 
Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute, Collective Bargaining & Labor Arbitration: An 
Overview, at http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/collective_bargaining.html (last visited Dec. 17, 
2002). 
 7. See Mark E. Zelek, Labor Grievance Arbitration in the United States, 21 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 197, 202 (1989) (discussing the benefits of grievance arbitration and the effect 
of the procedure in the field of labor employment).  A “grievance” is defined as “an assertion that 
the collective bargaining agreement has been violated” by one of the parties to the agreement.  Id. 
 8. Mayes, supra note 6, at 493 (citing MARVIN. F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, 
REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 32 (2d ed. 1990)).  The most common remedy for grievances arising 
from a collective bargaining agreement is to submit the dispute to an arbitrator, who will determine 
a resolution to the problem.  Zelek, supra note 7, at 197.  By providing for arbitration in a collective 
bargaining agreement, parties to the agreement have a method for “solving the unforeseeable by 
molding a system of private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for their 
solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties.”  Id.  
See also  Douglas E. Ray, Protecting the Parties’ Bargain After Misco: Court Review of Labor 
Arbitration Awards, 64 IND L.J. 1, 6 (1988) (discussing Misco decision and urging courts to 
generally defer to the decisions of labor arbitrators and discussing necessary limits and dangers of 
the public policy exception).  See also infra note 28. 
 9. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 865 F.2d 902, 903 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (holding that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate disputes over work assignments and 
thus a court could not decide the merits of the claim that the employer, in refusing to arbitrate, 
violated the collective bargaining agreement).  The arbitration clause is usually included in a 
collective bargaining agreement as a final stage in a grievance procedure designed to prevent the 
discharge of employees without just cause.  Id.  These grievance and arbitration procedures 
provided in the collective bargaining agreement are conventionally regarded as the union’s 
compensation for surrendering the right to strike during the period while the agreement is in force.  
See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 n.4 (1960) 
(commenting that the arbitration and grievance procedures are “the ‘quid pro quo’ for an agreement 
2
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Arbitration has gained widespread acceptance by Congress10 and the 
Supreme Court of the United States.11  With the extensive inclusion of 
arbitration as a means of resolving labor disputes, questions have arisen 
as to the court’s role (if any) in the arbitration process.  If the court is 
recognized as having some role in the arbitration process, the question 
then becomes: When is court intervention appropriate?12  Further 
                                                                                                                                 
not to strike”); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957) (stating 
that “[p]lainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not 
to strike”).  Because a labor union is unlikely to easily give up the right to strike, agreements to 
arbitrate grievances are seen as a substitute method for holding the employer to the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement.  Int’l Ass’n of Machinists,  865 F.2d at 903. 
 10. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2001).  In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act.  See 
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2001).  The principle objective of Congress was to “render commercial arbitration 
agreements enforceable in the face of a common law tradition that treated unexecuted promises to 
arbitrate as revocable.”  Samuel Estreicher, Symposium on Labor Arbitration Thirty Years after the 
Steelworkers Trilogy: Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 
753, 761 (1990) (addressing the question of the appropriate legal response to arbitration of 
employment disputes in nonunion settings).  However, it is important to note that the Federal 
Arbitration Act explicitly applies to commercial arbitration and not to labor arbitration.  9 U.S.C. § 
1 (2001) (stating that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, 
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”).  For 
further discussion of the Federal Arbitration Act, see notes 31-38 infra. 
  In 1947, Congress passed Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act in which 
Congress declared that it favored arbitration, as opposed to other methods, for resolving labor 
and/or industrial disputes.  See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2001).  This statute is also referred to as the Taft-
Hartley Act.  Roberto L. Corrada, Taft-Hartley Symposium: The First Fifty Years: The Arbitral 
Imperative in Labor and Employment Law, 47 CATH. U.L. REV. 919, 919 (1998) (examining 
arbitration in the workplace and discussing rationales that arbitration should be included in labor 
and employment law).  For further discussion of this statute, see notes 40-42 infra.  This statute will 
be referred to as “Section 301” throughout this note. 
 11 Zelek, supra note 7, at 200.  The United States Supreme Court established some basic 
legal principles which laid the foundation for labor arbitration that remain strong today.  Id.  See 
United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (holding that the function of the courts 
in a dispute arising from a collective bargaining agreement is limited to ascertaining whether the 
party seeking arbitration is making a claim which is governed by the contract in question and the 
court is not to weigh the merits of the grievance); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (holding that an arbitrator, and not the courts, is to decide the 
meaning of the collective bargaining agreement); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car 
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (holding that a reviewing court should not interfere with an arbitrator’s 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and such an award should not be vacated 
because the court’s interpretation is different than the arbitrator’s); Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (holding that the Taft-Hartley Act is not only a 
jurisdictional basis for federal courts over labor contract arbitration clauses but is also a source of 
procedural law for labor arbitration).  For a further discussion of these cases, see notes 42-49 infra. 
 12. See Curtin, supra note 3, at 339.  Traditionally, courts have intervened in arbitration “at 
the onset of arbitration to determine whether the agreement to arbitrate is valid and enforceable . . . 
whether the issue itself is arbitrable or whether it concerns an area where public policy dictates that 
all such disputes be resolved by the courts.”  Id.  Courts also may become involved in arbitration 
when it is complete and the arbitrator has rendered a decision.  Id.  Parties may ask a court to 
enforce an award and the court then “reviews the award to ensure that [its] enforcement will not 
3
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problems arise when parties petition a court to vacate an arbitration 
award.13  For instance, what is a reviewing court’s role if it finds that the 
arbitration award violates public policy?14  What is a reviewing court’s 
role when it finds the arbitrator’s factual findings are erroneous or 
irrational?15 
This note examines judicial review of arbitration awards 
emphasizing if and when a reviewing court can vacate an arbitrator’s 
award.16  Part II explores the goals and principles of arbitration,17 the 
benefits of arbitration,18 arbitration legislation,19 and grounds for 
vacating an arbitration award.20  Also discussed in Part II are Supreme 
Court decisions dealing with judicial review of arbitration awards.21  Part 
III provides a statement of the facts,22 the procedural history,23 and the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n v. Garvey.24  Finally, Part IV analyzes the Garvey 
decision, argues for a broader scope of judicial review of arbitration 
awards, and suggests an alternative ground for vacating arbitration 
awards.25 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Process of Arbitration 
Most employers and unions who enter into a collective bargaining 
relationship usually have a well-defined procedure for resolving disputes 
                                                                                                                                 
violate any procedural due process or other public policy concerns.”  Id. 
 13. See infra notes 43-71.  Problems generally arise when parties attempt to appeal an 
arbitration award because such appeals lead to delay and these delays may “undercut the entire labor 
arbitration by threatening both the finality of the process and the positive labor relations benefits of 
a final decision.”  Douglas E. Ray, Court Review of Labor Arbitration Awards Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 32 VILL. L. REV. 57, 67 (1987) (discussing how federal courts apply the Federal 
Arbitration Act in reviewing arbitration awards). 
 14. See infra notes 63-67. 
 15. See infra notes 68-71. 
 16. See infra Parts II-IV. 
 17. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 107 -84 and accompanying text. 
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which arise under the labor contract.26  The arbitrator’s role in this 
process is ordinarily very limited.27 
Arbitration promotes two primary objectives: “settling disputes 
efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation.”28  The benefits of 
arbitration explain its widespread use in labor disputes arising from 
collective bargaining agreements.29  However, “[m]uch of the benefit of 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC L. REV. 693, 698-99 
(1993) (discussing possible changes to labor arbitration principles in order to recognize it for what it 
can offer and so that it may be applied in a manner which is adapted to the aspects of employment 
law dispute resolution).  This procedure usually requires the parties to submit their grievances to 
arbitration.  Id. at 699-700.  For a general outline of how this procedure can be structured, see id. at 
698-701.  The parties to the collective bargaining agreement may fashion the arbitration process as 
they wish.  For example, the arbitration can be conducted by one arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, 
depending on how the parties structure their agreement.  Jane Byeff Korn, Changing Our 
Perspective on Arbitration: A Traditional and A Feminist View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 70 (1991) 
(discussing the courts’ view of arbitration from a traditional view and from a feminist perspective).  
Also, parties can select the arbitrator(s) “through the mutual preferences of the parties.”  Harold H. 
Bruff, Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal 
Programs, 67 TEX. L. REV. 441, 444 (1989) (discussing a general approach addressing the concerns 
raised by arbitration in federal programs).  This may be a key aspect of arbitration that makes the 
process more appealing to parties than traditional litigation.  Id. 
 27. Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective Bargaining 
Process, 66 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 571, 622 (1990) (discussing the way in which contracting parties 
and arbitrators should modify their behavior to guarantee that arbitral proceedings will optimally 
enhance labor-management relationships).  The arbitrator’s principal function “is to effectuate the 
intent of the parties.”  Id.  The arbitrator’s main “source of authority is the [actual] collective 
bargaining agreement and he [or she] must interpret and apply that agreement in accordance . . . 
with . . . the various needs and desires of the parties.”  Id. 
 28. Remmey v. Painewebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th  Cir. 1994) (holding that courts are 
not free to overturn an arbitration award because the court would have reached a different 
conclusion if presented with the same facts).  The objective of arbitration is commonly stated as the 
final disposition of differences between parties in a faster, less expensive, more expeditious and 
possibly less formal manner than is available in ordinary court proceedings.  4 AM. JUR. 2D 
Alternative Dispute Resolution § 8 (1995).  But see Julian J. Moore, Note, Arbitral Review (or Lack 
Thereof): Examining the Procedural Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory Claims, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1572, 1595-98 (2000) (discussing that some of these objectives and benefits need additional 
safeguards in order for the system to work properly and for the benefit of all parties involved). 
 29. Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the 
Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3, 3 (1988) (discussing the 
need in the federal courts for a uniform rule of public policy in allowing courts to vacate arbitration 
awards).  One such benefit is that arbitration allows workers to “have their day in court,” which can 
be “therapeutic” to parties that have a grievance with their employer.  Id.  Another recognized 
benefit of arbitration is that the decision involves a judgment from a neutral third party who is well 
known and respected by the parties.  Id.  An alternative benefit includes the flexibility of the 
process, which can be adjusted to suit the needs of the particular parties to the dispute.  Id.  But see, 
William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards—Thirty Years of the 
Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 464, 493 
(1989) (indicating that the arbitration process is beginning to resemble traditional litigation, with the 
pervasive presence of lawyers, cross-examination of witnesses, submission of briefs, and written 
5
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labor arbitration . . . appears to be premised on the finality of the 
arbitrator’s ruling.”30 
B.  Legislation Relating to Arbitration 
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act31 to permit 
judicial enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements.32  The major 
                                                                                                                                 
decisions containing legal citations). 
  For additional benefits of the arbitration process and specific methods of alternative 
dispute resolution, see Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 
TUL. L. REV. 1, 11-15 (1987) (discussing the relationship of alternative dispute resolution and 
litigation); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986) (discussing the theory behind alternative dispute 
resolution).  However, these advantages are usually nullified if arbitration decisions are subject to 
broad judicial review.  Moore, supra note 28, at 1583. 
  But see, Di Jiang-Schuerger, Note, Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration + Litigation?, 4 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231, 246 (1999) (discussing some of the disadvantages of arbitration).  
Although arbitration is often commended for its vast benefits to parties involved, there are some 
possible disadvantages to arbitrating disputes, rather than engaging in litigation.  Id.  These 
disadvantages may include possible bias or partiality of the arbitrator and the inability to appeal 
awards under a regular standard of judicial review.  Id.  Some parties may appreciate the fast and 
final decision that arbitration produces, but others would rather have the assurance that any possible 
legal or factual mistakes can be brought to a court for correction. Id 
 30. Mark Berger, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Practices, Policies and 
Sanctions, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 245, 249 (1992) (discussing the standards of judicial review of 
arbitration awards and possible sanctions for parties who improperly seek such review).  The speed, 
low cost, and informality of the process would not be of much benefit to parties if a decision was 
not considered final and binding.  Id.  If arbitration decisions are not considered final, then an 
arbitration hearing would just be an added step in the litigation process, which most parties would 
probably choose to forego.  Id.  See also, Charles J. Coleman & Gerald C. Coleman, Toward a New 
Paradigm of Labor Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 27 (1995) (stating 
that “[a]n arbitration award is supposed to be the last word on a subject”). 
 31. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). The Federal Arbitration Act, by its language, appears to exclude 
labor arbitration from its scope.  See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  Section one states that “nothing herein 
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class 
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”  Id. 
 32. Id.  The Act was passed in response to the refusal of many courts to enforce arbitration 
clauses in contracts.  Karon A. Sasser, Freedom to Contract for Expanded Judicial Review in 
Arbitration Agreements, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 337, 340 (2000) (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Companies v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995)).  Congress expressed its intent that the Act was to 
reverse past judicial animosity toward arbitration and to place arbitration agreements as being equal 
to other enforceable contracts.  Curtin, supra note 3, at 339 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96 at 1 
(1924)).  The Federal Arbitration Act favors arbitration, particularly when parties have contractually 
agreed to arbitration as the method for settling disputes.  Lane-Tahoe, Inc. v. Kindred Constr. Co., 
536 P.2d 491, 493 (Nev. 1975) (holding that arbitration is appropriate when the parties to a 
construction contract have agreed to it as the  method for settling disputes).  Many changes to the 
courts’ treatment of arbitration agreements followed the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act.  
Sasser, supra, at 340 (discussing the split in the federal courts on attitudes towards contracting for 
expanded judicial review).  See notes 33-38 infra. 
  The underlying purposes of the Act have been interpreted differently by the courts.  For 
6
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sections of the Act make written arbitration clauses in contracts “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable,”33 provide methods for courts to enforce 
arbitration agreements,34 permit courts to compel arbitration,35 provide 
for selection of arbitrators,36 and allocate certain powers to the 
arbitrator(s).37  The Act also places strict boundaries on judicial review 
of arbitration awards.38  After 1925, parties to labor agreements began to 
seek enforcement of collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate under 
the Federal Arbitration Act.39 
                                                                                                                                 
example, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that “[t]he underlying purpose of the Act is to preclude 
court intervention into the merits of disputes when arbitration has been provided for contractually.”  
Lane-Tahoe, 536 P.2d at 493.  The federal courts, however, have stated that the Act was passed, in 
part, to relieve congestion in the courts and to provide parties with alternative methods for resolving 
disputes that are quicker and cheaper than litigation.  Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953) 
(stating that the Federal Arbitration Act establishes the desirability of arbitration as a method of 
avoiding the delay and expenses of litigation).  But see Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 219 (1985) (rejecting the suggestion that the Act was passed to promote the quick resolution of 
claims).  The Supreme Court in Dean Witter stated that the sole purpose of the Act was to place 
arbitration agreements on the same ground as other enforceable contracts.  Id. at 219. 
 33. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 34. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).  Section three states that courts “shall stay the trial of [any issue 
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration] until such arbitration has been 
had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”  Id.  However, the court must first determine if 
“the issue involved is referable to arbitration under [the] agreement.”  Id. 
 35. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).  The Act empowers the courts to compel parties to arbitrate when 
it is expressly provided for in a valid agreement.  Id. 
 36. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).  Section five allows the parties to the agreement to appoint or 
name the arbitrator by a specific method provided for in the agreement.  Id.  If for some reason, the 
parties do not appoint an arbitrator, either party to the dispute can petition the court to appoint an 
arbitrator for the parties.  Id. 
 37. See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).  Section seven provides arbitrators with the power to summon 
witnesses, documents, and other relevant evidence when conducting the arbitration hearing.  Id. 
 38. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2000).  For further discussion of these Sections, see infra notes 
52-54 and accompanying text. 
 39. FAIRWEATHER’S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 4 (Ray J. 
Schoonhoven ed., The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 4th ed. 1999).  Most courts, however, hold 
that the Act is not applicable to collective bargaining agreements.  Id.  See, e.g., A.M. Castle & Co. 
v. United Steelworkers, 898 F. Supp. 602, 610 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (stating that the Federal Arbitration 
Act is “formally inapplicable to labor arbitration,” but recognizing that the Act can be used as 
source to guide labor arbitration cases); Dean Foods Co. v. United Steelworkers, 911 F. Supp. 1116, 
1123 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (indicating that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to arbitration awards 
involving interstate commerce or admiralty rather than to labor arbitration awards); McClendon v. 
Continental Group, Inc, 648 F. Supp. 1115, 1117 n.1 (D.N.J. 1986) (indicating that the language of 
the Federal Arbitration Act and past case law “raises a serious question as to whether the 
applicability of the Act to labor arbitration agreements retains any vitality in this circuit”).  It 
appears that the United States Supreme Court stated its opinion on this issue in Misco, where in 
dictum, the Court stated that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to labor arbitration awards 
“but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases. . . .”  
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987).  But see, David P. 
Pierce, Comment, The Federal Arbitration Act: Conflicting Interpretations of Its Scope, 61 U. CIN. 
7
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In 1947, Congress passed Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act.40  This statute states that arbitration, rather than strikes 
and/or other measures, is the preferred method for settling industrial 
disputes.41  In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of 
Alabama, the United States Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether 
Section 301 conferred jurisdiction upon the courts to compel or stay 
labor arbitration and to review an arbitration award.42 
C.  Vacating an Arbitration Award 
In a trio of cases, commonly referred to as the “Steelworkers 
Trilogy,”43 the Supreme Court established the basic principles regarding 
judicial review of arbitration awards.44  The first general rule gleaned 
                                                                                                                                 
L. REV. 623 (1992) (arguing for expanding the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act in future cases). 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).  See supra note 10. 
 41. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (2000).  This section states: 
  “Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the 
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation 
of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.”  Id.  The United States Supreme Court has stated 
that statutes such as the Taft-Hartley Act “reflect a decided preference for private settlement of 
labor disputes without the intervention of government.”  Misco, 484 U.S. at 37. 
  However, the lower federal courts were unsure as to whether Section 301 or the Federal 
Arbitration Act conferred jurisdiction upon the courts to compel or stay labor arbitration and to 
enforce or vacate an arbitration award.  FAIRWEATHER’S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR 
ARBITRATION 4 (Ray J. Schoonhoven ed., The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 4th ed. 1999) (citing 
Archibald Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1954)).  In 
1953, the District Court of Massachusetts held that federal courts could enforce under Section 301 
an agreement to arbitrate a dispute, concerning the interpretation and application of a labor 
agreement.  Textile Workers Union v. Am. Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 142 (D. Mass. 1953).  
The court also stated that federal courts should utilize the Federal Arbitration Act as a guiding 
analogy in enforcing arbitration agreements.  Id.  Several other cases have held that when dealing 
with labor agreements, federal courts should use the Federal Arbitration Act as a guide in labor 
arbitration cases.  See, e.g., Pizzuto v. Hall’s Motor Transit Co.,  409 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Va. 1976) 
(holding that the Federal Arbitration Act is not applicable to collective bargaining contracts, but that 
the act must be looked to for guidance as to what period of time is reasonable for filing an appeal 
from arbitration awards pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement); Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. 
Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1127 (3d Cir. 1969) (stating that even though the Federal Arbitration Act 
applies only to commercial arbitration, review standards utilized under the Act could be analogized 
to judicial review of labor agreements). 
 42. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 458-59 (1957).  The Court 
stated that Section 301 is the jurisdictional basis for the federal courts over labor contract arbitration 
clauses. Id. at 450-51. According to the Court, the statute is also the source of procedural law for 
labor arbitration.  Id.  But courts continue to look to the Federal Arbitration Act as a guide for 
reviewing arbitration awards.  See supra note 41. 
 43. The “Steelworkers Trilogy” includes the following cases: United Steelworkers v. Am. 
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 
574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See also 
supra note 11. 
 44. Estreicher, supra note 10, at 757.  These cases established a general framework of default 
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from these three cases is that “grievances are presumed to be 
arbitrable.”45  The second general rule is that judicial review of an 
arbitrator’s decision is extremely limited.46 
Twenty-seven years later in United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. 
Misco, Inc.,47 the Supreme Court reiterated the basic principles that it 
established in the Steelworkers Trilogy.48  The Court went further than it 
previously had in stating that as long as the arbitrator is arguably 
construing or applying the contract, and acting within the scope of 
his/her authority, a court cannot overturn that decision.49 
                                                                                                                                 
rules for labor agreements with arbitration clauses that require arbitration proceedings for virtually 
all disputes arising during the agreement’s term and further stringently restricting access to the 
courts except where in aid of the arbitration process.  Id. 
 45. Martin H. Malin, Symposium on Labor Arbitration Thirty Years After the Steelworkers 
Trilogy: Foreword: Labor Arbitration Thirty Years After the Steelworkers Trilogy, 66 CHI.-KENT. 
L. REV. 551, 551 (1990) (discussing the state of labor arbitration as it existed before and after the 
decision in the Steelworkers Trilogy).  The Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question of 
arbitrability—whether a collective bargaining agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate 
the particular grievance—for judicial determination.  United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigating Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n. 7 (1960).  Since arbitrability is for the courts to decide, the 
Supreme Court has laid down the general rule that where a contract contains an arbitration clause, 
there is a presumption of arbitrability, stating that “[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of 
coverage.”  Id. at 583.  The Supreme Court has prohibited lower courts from deciding the merits of 
a particular grievance filed under a contract with an arbitration clause and has instead limited them 
to inquiring whether the claim on its face is in fact governed by the contract.  United Steelworkers 
v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 564 (1960). 
 46. James M. Magee, The Public Policy Exception to Judicial Deferral of Labor Arbitration 
Awards—How Far Should Expansion Go?, 39 S.C. L. REV. 465, 469 (1988).  When a party brings a 
suit to force another party to comply with an arbitrator’s award, a court may not overturn the award 
simply because it disagrees with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the agreement or believes that the 
arbitrator did not apply correct construction principles.  United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & 
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).  The Supreme Court has emphasized the fact that the 
arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract was bargained for and as long as that decision concerns the 
contract’s construction, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation 
differs from the arbitrator’s.  Id.  The Court stated that the proper approach to arbitration under 
collective bargaining agreements is for courts to refuse to review the merits of the award.  Id. at 596.  
If a court were to review the merits of every arbitration decision, the provisions rendering an 
arbitrator’s award final would be meaningless.  Id.  The Court also recognized that the federal 
policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if a court had a final say on the 
merits of arbitration awards.  Id.  The rationale behind such a bright line rule is that the parties 
contracted for the settlement of their disputes by an arbitrator of their choice and if dissatisfied with 
the decision, they are free to select a different arbitrator in the future.  Dennis O. Lynch, Deferral, 
Waiver, and Arbitration Under the NLRA: From Status to Contract and Back Again, 44 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 237, 267 (1989) (analyzing the process of disputing and the relationship between that 
process and the substantive outcomes of workplace disputes). 
 47. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). 
 48. See supra notes 43-46. 
 49. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.  The Court emphasized that a court is not authorized to reconsider 
the merits of an arbitration award even though the parties may allege the award was decided on 
errors of fact or on a misinterpretation of the contract.  Id.  It is the arbitrator’s role to make findings 
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As evidenced above, the United States Supreme Court has 
constantly reiterated that a court’s review of an arbitration award is 
extremely limited.50  The question therefore arises, can a court ever 
vacate an arbitration award?  The Federal Arbitration Act51 establishes 
four statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award.52  The first 
three grounds for vacating an arbitration award address the perception of 
fairness and impartiality in the arbitration proceedings.53  The final 
ground addresses the arbitrator’s conduct (or power) in deciding the 
matter.54 
                                                                                                                                 
of fact in reaching a decision, and a court cannot reject those findings simply because it disagrees 
with them.  Id.  The Court seemed concerned that too many disappointed parties were seeking 
judicial relief from arbitration awards and attempted to resuscitate the doctrine that arbitration 
awards are to be considered final and binding on the parties.  FAIRWEATHER’S PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 559 (Ray J. Schoonhoven ed., The Bureau of National Affairs, 
Inc. 4th ed. 1999). 
 50. See supra notes 45-49. 
 51. See supra notes 31-38. 
 52. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). 
 53. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1-3) (2000). 
 54. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2000).  It is important to remember that the Act applies only to 
commercial arbitration and not labor agreements.  See supra note 10.  However, courts may look to 
the Act when deciding labor disputes.  See supra note 41.  Section ten of the Federal Arbitration Act 
sets out four specific grounds for when a court may vacate an arbitrator’s decision.  The pertinent 
portions provide: 
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court . . . may make an order vacating 
the award upon the  application of any party to the arbitration— 
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
(2) Where there was evidence of partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either 
of them; 
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the 
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any 
party have been prejudiced; or 
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them 
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made. 
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).  These extremely limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award “reflect 
the [Federal Arbitration Act]’s bias towards upholding arbitrations.”  Monica J. Washington, Note, 
Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: Judicial Review Without Judicial 
Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844, 850 (1999) (examining recent appellate cases and the policy 
rationale supporting increased judicial scrutiny of an arbitral decision).  For a detailed analysis of 
these standards, see Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking 
the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 443, 451-61 (1998) (discussing new practices that should be implemented in 
commercial arbitration decisions in order to maintain their validity).  See also Andrew M. 
Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of § 10(a)(4) of Federal Arbitration Act (9 
U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(4)) Providing for Vacating of Arbitration Awards Where Arbitrators Exceed or 
Imperfectly Execute Powers, 136 A.L.R. FED. 183 (2001) (collecting and analyzing federal cases 
which have applied this section of the Federal Arbitration Act in vacating arbitration awards). 
10
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Because the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to labor 
disputes,55 and Section 301 does not provide statutory grounds for 
vacation, courts have established some basic standards for vacating a 
labor arbitration award.56 
1.  Vacation for Error of Law 
The majority of courts take a deferential view to arbitration awards 
holding that an award must be in “manifest disregard of the law” in 
order for it to be vacated.57  Most courts refuse to vacate an arbitrator’s 
award based on this argument.58  However, some arbitration awards have 
been vacated using this standard.59 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 55. See supra notes 10 and 39. See also Ray, supra note 13, at 67 (arguing that the Federal 
Arbitration Act does not and should not apply to arbitration arising under a collective bargaining 
agreement). 
 56. See infra notes 57-71.  For a general overview of these standards, see Bret F. Randall, 
Comment, The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for 
Arbitration Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 759 (1992) (discussing the current judicially created 
standards for vacating an arbitration award and the history, application, and policy of the standards). 
 57. See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 89-98 (1997), for a general discussion of this standard 
and how courts apply it.  The manifest disregard of the law standard was first established in the 
dictum of Wilko v. Swan.  Norman S. Poser, Arbitration: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: 
Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 505 (1998).  This case was overruled on 
different grounds, but the Court has continued to cite the manifest disregard dictum with approval.  
Id. at 505. 
  Courts have given this standard varying definitions.  See, e.g., Montes v. Shearson 
Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “[t]o manifestly disregard the 
law, one must be conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986) (defining the standard as implying that 
the arbitrator appreciates the existence of clearly governing legal principle but deliberately decides 
to ignore it); Durkin v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Corp., 986 F. Supp. 1356, 1358 (D. Kan. 1997) 
(defining the standard as “willful inattentiveness to the governing law”); Verland Found. v. United 
Steelworkers, No. 92-2225, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20373, at *12 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (defining the 
standard as “beyond the authorized confines of the agreement between the parties”). 
 58. See, e.g., Nat’l Mar. Union v. Fed. Barge Lines, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 256, 258-59 (E.D. Mo. 
1969) (upholding an arbitration award that was alleged to be contrary to the federally established 
Jones Act by determining that the award was not totally inconsistent with the statute).  The Second 
Circuit has used the “manifest disregard of the law” standard as a means for giving extreme judicial 
deference to arbitrator’s decisions.  DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
 59. See, e.g., Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local No. 520, Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, 283 
F.2d 936, 940-41 (4th Cir. 1960) (holding that vacation of an arbitration award that would require 
an employer to commit an unfair labor practice is proper); Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. 
Autotote Sys., Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that the arbitrator acted in 
manifest disregard of the law in accelerating payments owed by the operator even though the 
arbitrator had found that the provider had breached the contract); Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., No. C-80-0748-WWS, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350 at *1-2, (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 
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2.  Vacation Because the Award Does Not Draw its Essence from 
the Labor Agreement 
The Supreme Court has held that courts have the power to vacate an 
award when the award does not “draw its essence” from the labor 
agreement.60  This standard has led some courts to vacate an arbitrator’s 
award, despite the traditional discretion afforded arbitration awards.61  
Most courts, however, have refused to vacate an arbitration award based 
on this standard.62 
                                                                                                                                 
1980) (holding that vacation of arbitration award was proper when it required the performance of an 
illegal act).  For a more thorough analysis of this vacatur standard, see Adam Milam, Comment, A 
House Built on Sand: Vacating Arbitration Awards for Manifest Disregard of the Law, 29 CUMB. L. 
REV. 705 (1998) (discussing the development of the manifest disregard of the law standard among 
the circuits and proposing a uniform standard that should be incorporated into the Federal 
Arbitration Act).  But see Randall, supra note 56, at 766 (arguing that courts are extremely reluctant 
to vacate an arbitration award based on the “manifest disregard of the law” standard, and finding no 
cases vacating an award on these grounds). 
 60. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).  The 
Court stated that an arbitrator’s role “is confined to interpret[ing] and apply[ing] . . . the collective 
bargaining agreement “and that the arbitrator may look to many sources for guidance, but that “his 
award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.”  
Id.  Courts have given varying standards to determine if an arbitration award “draws its essence” 
from the labor agreement.  See, e.g., The Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. v. The Akron Newspaper Guild 
Local No. 7, 114 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that an arbitrator’s award fails to draw its 
essence from the agreement when it conflicts with the express terms of the agreement, imposes 
additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement, or is based on “general 
considerations of fairness and equity” instead of the exact terms of the agreement); Ludwig Honold 
Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969) (holding that an arbitrator’s award “draws 
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement if the interpretation can in any rational way be 
derived from the agreement, view[ed] in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia 
of the parties’ intention”). 
 61. See supra notes 45-49.  For cases vacating arbitration awards based on this standard, see, 
e.g., The Beacon Journal  Publ’g Co. v. The Akron Newspaper Guild Local No. 7, 114F.3d 596, 601 
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding that an arbitration award that included four supervisors in vacation  
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, despite the fact that those employees were 
exempt from the agreement, did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement); 
Kewanee Mach. Div., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Local No. 21, Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 450 F. 
Supp. 1074, 1078 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (holding that an aribitrator exceeded his authority when he 
reinstated an employee who was terminated pursuant to a labor agreement rule that two absent 
occasions in a month were cause for termination, despite the fact that the employee’s absences were 
due to illnesses). 
 62. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United Steelworkers, 243 F.3d 345, 348 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(upholding an arbitration award where the arbitrator added terms to the contract even though he was 
not empowered under the collective bargaining agreement to do so); Local 77, Am. Fed’n of 
Musicians v. Philadelphia Orchestra Ass’n, 252 F. Supp. 787, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (holding that an 
arbitration award that required orchestra members to travel by airplane would not be vacated 
because its “essence” could be found by the absence of requirements of travel in the labor 
agreement).  Many of these courts reason that the arbitrator has been given authority to interpret the 
labor agreement and an award should not be upset without an express provision excluding the 
subject matter from arbitration.  Id.  But see infra note 120, discussing the problems with the 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss2/4
LIPINSKI1.DOC 4/7/03  12:54 PM 
2003] MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N V. GERVEY 337 
3.  Vacation Based on Public Policy Considerations 
Many courts hold an arbitration award that violates public policy 
should be vacated.63 Despite the Supreme Court’s precedent on this 
standard,64 the circuit courts have divided on how they apply this 
exception.65 The majority of circuits follow the narrow public policy 
                                                                                                                                 
“essence” standard. 
 63. See Edwards, supra note 29, at 3-5.  The public policy exception which permitted 
vacation of an arbitration award began in 1983.  Id.  At this time, the Supreme Court held that an 
award should only be vacated on narrow public policy grounds.  W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, 
Int’l Union of United Rubber, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).  The Court defined the public policy 
exception as being “well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws 
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.’”  Id.  For a 
more in-depth discussion of the public policy exception to vacating arbitration awards, see Maria T. 
Roebker, Note, Public Policy Exception to the General Rule of Judicial Deference to Labor 
Arbitration Awards: United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 364 (1987), 
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 819 (1988) (discussing the Misco case and the Supreme Court’s attempts to 
encourage finality of arbitration awards and the possibility of limiting finality by carefully 
formulated considerations of public policy). 
 64. See supra notes 43-49. 
 65. See Scott Barbakoff, Note, Application of the Public Policy Exception for the 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: There is No Place Like “The Home” in Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. 
Service Employees International Union, District 1199, 43 VILL. L. REV. 829, 830-31 (1998).  The 
majority of circuits interpret the public policy exception narrowly, showing great deference to the 
arbitrator because the parties bargained for an arbitrator’s judgment.  Id.  See, e.g., Limitorque Corp. 
v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, Lodge No. 10, No. 97-2345, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15081 at *3-4 (4th 
Cir. July 6, 1998) (discussing in dictum that a court will not overturn an arbitration award unless it 
violates a well-settled and prevailing public policy); SFIC Props., Inc. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 
Local Lodge 311, 103 F.3d 923, 924 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding scope of review of arbitral awards in 
labor disputes extremely narrow); Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that a court’s ability to vacate an arbitration award is defined under strict 
statutory or judicially created standards); Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 
782 (11th Cir. 1993) (ruling that the public policy exception allows a court to vacate an arbitration 
award if it is contrary to well-defined and dominant public policy ascertained by laws and legal 
precedents); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Int’l Union, UAW, 981 F.2d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that an arbitration award must violate some explicit public policy); Am. Postal Workers 
Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the public policy exception 
is extremely narrow); Capital Dist. Chapter v. Int’l Bhd. of Painters, Local No. 201, 743 F.2d 142, 
147 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that public policy exception is very narrow). 
  The minority of circuit courts apply a broad interpretation of the public policy exception, 
expanding it to account for considerations of public welfare.  Barbakoff, supra, at 831.  See, e.g., 
Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local 204 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 
1428-29 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that an arbitration award that violates public safety regulations 
should be vacated based on the public policy exception); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers 
Union, 736 F.2d 822, 825 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that a public policy that clearly dictates common 
sense is enough to vacate an arbitration award); Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. 
Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that a company rule prohibiting 
employees from contacting the USDA was against public policy); Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. 
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, Local Lodge 1609, 621 F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that 
arbitrator’s decision did not offend a national policy against smoking in asbestos plants).  However, 
over the past years, some of these circuits have begun to apply the public policy exception narrowly.  
13
Lipinski: Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
LIPINSKI1.DOC 4/7/03  12:54 PM 
338 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:325 
exception, defining it as the Supreme Court did in Grace.66  Other 
circuits define the public policy exception broadly, vacating arbitration 
awards that violate general considerations of public interests.67 
4.  Vacation for Errors in Fact 
Normally when a party petitions the court to vacate an arbitration 
award based on a factual error on the part of the arbitrator, courts refuse 
to vacate the award.68  At least one court, prior to the Misco decision, 
vacated an arbitration award because of factual errors.69  The Supreme 
                                                                                                                                 
See Barbakoff, supra, at 855-59. 
  The Third Circuit has applied a two-prong test that can be considered the “middle ground” 
of the public policy exception.  Id. at 852-53.  See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s 
Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring a court to identify a well-defined and dominant 
public policy that is expressed or implied by statute or regulation and then to consider whether the 
arbitration award violated the identified public policy or would undermine the stated purpose behind 
the policy). 
 66. See, e.g., United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 382 
(3d Cir. 1995) (upholding an arbitration award that reinstated a bus driver who had been involved in 
twenty-four accidents in twelve years because Suburban had not provided the court with laws and 
legal precedents which describe an explicit public policy that the award violated); Chrysler Motors 
Corp. v. Int’l Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding an arbitrator’s 
award that reinstated an employee accused of sexual harassment). 
 67. See, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1428-29 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that an arbitration award ordering an 
employer to rehire an employee who deliberately violated federally imposed safety rules at 
employer’s nuclear power plant should be vacated under the public policy exception); Amalgamated 
Meat Cutters, Local Union 540 v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 125 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that an arbitration award upholding a company policy of requiring workers to report 
unsanitary plant conditions to supervisors first, was contrary to public policy because it affected not 
only the Company and its employees, but also the consuming public). 
 68. See, e.g., JS, Inc. v. Local 3, No. 90 Civ. 2511 (LMM), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 329 at *3-
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1991) (upholding an arbitration award even though the court acknowledged 
that the award rested on an alleged miscalculation or factual error); Keuchel v. Inmont Corp. Rapid 
Processing Co., C.A. No. 13051, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 9089 at *4-5, (9th Dist. Oct. 7, 1987) 
(holding that an arbitrator is the sole judge of the laws and of the evidence so that an award that is 
factually or legally wrong will not be vacated); Safeway Stores v. Am. Bakery Int’l Union, Local 
111, 390 F.2d 79, 83 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that an arbitration award put forward a “passably 
plausible—even if perhaps erroneous—analysis” of the employment plan and refusing to vacate the 
award). 
 69. See Elecs. Corp. of Am. v. Int’l Union of Elec. Local 272, 492 F.2d 1255, 1257 (1st Cir. 
1974) (vacating an arbitration award in which there was a “gross mistake . . . made out by evidence, 
but for which . . . a different result would have been reached”).  The First Circuit clarified its ruling 
by saying that “in order to satisfy this test, the error must involve the ‘fact’ underlying the 
arbitrator’s decision.”  Id.  The Sixth Circuit has defined this standard of vacating an arbitration 
award by indicating that “where the record . . . before the arbitrator demonstrates an unambiguous 
and undisputed mistake of fact and . . . strong reliance on that mistake . . . in making his award . . . 
the arbitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that vacation may be proper.”  
Nat’l Post Office Mailhandlers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss2/4
LIPINSKI1.DOC 4/7/03  12:54 PM 
2003] MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N V. GERVEY 339 
Court attempted to address this issue in Misco70 by indicating that even 
obviously erroneous factual findings are not a basis for an award’s 
vacation.71 
The Federal Arbitration Act and Section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act have commingled as the authority for courts’ 
decisions upholding or vacating arbitration awards.72  Notwithstanding 
the type of agreement involved (commercial or labor), courts have 
extremely limited the scope of review of arbitration awards.73  The 
Supreme Court recently reiterated this extreme judicial deference in 
Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey.74 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of the Facts 
In the 1980’s, the Major League Baseball Players Association filed 
grievances against the Major League Baseball Clubs.75  The Association 
alleged that the Clubs violated the collective bargaining agreement by 
engaging in collusion76 in the market for free agents.77  Arbitration was 
                                                                                                                                 
an arbitrator’s clear mistake of fact in finding an employee guilty prior to his discharge did not 
require vacation of the arbitration award). 
 70. See supra notes 47-49. 
 71. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987).  The Court 
indicated that “improvident, even silly factfinding . . . is hardly [a] sufficient basis for disregarding 
[an arbitrator’s factual findings].”  Id.  Courts dealing with the Federal Arbitration Act have held 
that “[f]actual or legal errors . . . even clear or gross errors—do not authorize courts to annul 
awards . . . under the FAA. . . .”  Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that a “searching review of arbitral awards . . . would . . . transform from a 
commercially useful alternative method of dispute resolution into a burdensome additional step on 
the march through the court system”).  Following the Misco decision, commentators have asserted 
that disappointed parties who wish to vacate arbitration awards have “all but given up making 
arbitrators’ assertedly erroneous findings of fact the linchpin of their actions.” FAIRWEATHER’S 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION, 575  (Ray J. Schoonhoven ed., The Bureau of 
National Affairs, Inc. 4th ed. 1999).  This may explain the lack of recent court decisions that have 
vacated arbitration awards because of factual errors. 
 72. See supra notes 31-42. 
 73. See supra notes 43-71.  In addition to the grounds and standards for vacation discussed 
above, other possible grounds for vacation of arbitration awards include situations where the 
arbitration proceeding was “tainted with corruption, misconduct, or bias,” or when the arbitrator has 
exceeded his or her authority.  Poser, supra note 57, at 471 (discussing the “manifest disregard of 
the law” standard for vacating or modifying an arbitration award and a proposed alternative). 
 74. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001).  See infra Part III. 
 75. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 505. 
 76. See WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 446 (1986) (defining “collusion” as 
“a secret agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights often by the 
forms of law”). 
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held pursuant to these grievances and it was found that the Clubs 
colluded resulting in damage to the players.78  Following the arbitrator’s 
findings, the Association and the Clubs entered into a Global Settlement 
Agreement.79 
Utilizing the Global Settlement Agreement and the Framework, 
Steve Garvey,80 a retired first baseman, submitted a claim for damages 
of $3 million.81  “He alleged that his contract with the San Diego Padres 
was not extended in the 1988 and 1989 baseball seasons because of 
collusion.”82  In February 1996, the Association rejected Garvey’s claim, 
concluding that he had not presented any evidence that the Padres 
actually made an offer to extend his contract.83 
                                                                                                                                 
 77. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 505.  These allegations covered the 
1985, 1986, and 1987 baseball seasons.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 506.  Collusion by the Clubs was found after the 1985 season by arbitrator Thomas 
Roberts. Ronald Blum, Appeals Court Likens Collusion to Black Sox Scandal, THE FORT WORTH 
STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb. 15, 2000, at Sports 6 (discussing the federal court of appeals decision in the 
Garvey case).  Arbitrator George Nicolau made similar rulings that the owners conspired after the 
1986 and 1987 seasons.  Id.  Despite these findings, Major League Baseball Commissioners Bud 
Selig and Peter Ueberroth have never acknowledged management’s conspiracy against free agents.  
Id.  Arbitration is still widely used in Major League Baseball to settle numerous disputes, 
particularly issues  dealing with players’ salaries.  See generally, Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of 
Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 221 (1998); Kevin A. Rings, Note, 
Baseball Free Agency and Salary Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST.  J. ON DISP. RESOL. 243 (1987). 
 79. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 506.  Pursuant to this Agreement, the 
Baseball Clubs established a $280 million fund to be distributed to players injured by the collusion 
of the Clubs.  Id.  The Association also developed a “Framework” to determine and evaluate 
individual player’s claims.  Id.  Under the Framework, the Association was required to propose an 
overall distribution plan or a partial distribution plan for the claims relating to the affected seasons.  
Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 2000).  Each recommended plan was submitted to 
players with claims and also to the arbitrator.  Id.  The players could object to the proposed 
distribution plan recommendations and the Association would respond by providing the arbitrator 
with a written statement of how they arrived at the proposed damage evaluation for a particular 
player.  Id.  A player who objected to the plan could request oral argument before the arbitrator.  Id. 
 80. From 1969-1982, Steve Garvey played first base for the Los Angeles Dodgers.  David G. 
Savage, Ruling Denies Garvey; Jurisprudence: Supreme Court reverses federal court in $3.2 
million collusion case, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 15, 2001, at 1, Sports Part 4 (discussing the 
Supreme Court decision involving Steve Garvey’s claim for damages alleged to have resulted from 
collusion).  He was a National League all-star eight times and the league’s most valuable player in 
1974.  Id.  He became a free agent after the 1982 season and signed a five-year contract with the 
San Diego Padres.  Id.  Steve Garvey led the Padres to its first World Series appearance in 1984. Id. 
 81. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 506.  
 82. Id.  Ironically, Steve Garvey’s final season of professional baseball was after the 1987 
season, during which he suffered an arm injury and played in only 27 games for the Padres.  Savage, 
supra note 80, at 1, Sports Part 4. 
 83. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 506.  The Framework set forth factors 
to be considered in evaluating players’ claims, as well as specific requirements for lost contract 
extension claims.  Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 2000).  A player’s claim was 
recognized only if it was “shown that the club in question actually made a specific offer of a 
contract extension only to later summarily withdraw that offer pursuant to the scenario of the 
16
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During the arbitration hearing, Garvey testified that the Padres had 
offered to extend his contract for the 1988 and 1989 seasons and then 
withdrew the offer after the baseball Clubs began colluding with other 
teams.84  Garvey’s main piece of evidence was a letter from Ballard 
Smith, the Padres’ President and CEO from 1979 to 1987.85  Despite this 
evidence, the arbitrator  rejected Garvey’s claim, explaining that “[t]here 
exists, however, substantial doubt as to the credibility of the statements 
in the Smith letter.”86 
B.  Procedural History 
Garvey moved in Federal District Court for the Central District of 
California to vacate the arbitrator’s award.87  On December 8, 1997, the 
court denied Garvey’s motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award.88  Garvey 
appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.89 
                                                                                                                                 
collusion program.”  Id. at 584.  Garvey objected to this finding and subsequently to the 
Framework, and an arbitration hearing was conducted.  Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 
U.S. at 506. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  This letter stated that before the end of the 1985 season, Smith had offered to extend 
Garvey’s contract through the 1989 season, but that the Padres subsequently refused to negotiate 
with Garvey due to collusion.  Id. at 506-07.  Strangely enough, in responses to claim questionnaires 
submitted in 1988 and 1991, Garvey never stated that a specific offer had been made to him by the 
Padres but only stated that “it would have been reasonable” for such an offer to have been made.  
Legal Defense Fund, Case Decisions: Garvey v. Major League Baseball Players Association, at 
http://www.porac.org/ldf/cases (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).  
 86. Garvey, 203 F.3d at 586.  The arbitrator noted that there were “stark contradictions” 
between the 1996 letter and Smith’s testimony in the earlier arbitration proceedings regarding 
collusion.  Id.  In those prior hearings, Smith denied that the Clubs had engaged in collusion and 
stated that the Padres were simply not interested in extending Garvey’s contract.  Id.  The arbitrator 
was unable to find a “specific offer of extension” made prior to the collusion “only to thereafter be 
withdrawn when the collusion scheme was initiated” which he stated was required under the 
Framework.  Id.  Concluding that Smith’s letter lacked credibility, coupled with the absence of any 
other evidence supporting Garvey’s claim, the arbitrator rejected Garvey’s claim for damages, 
reasoning that Garvey’s contract was probably not extended because of his age and recent injury 
history, and that the collusion of the Clubs had no effect on whether or not the Padres extended 
Garvey’s contract.  Id. 
 87. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 507.  Garvey’s motion for vacating the 
award argued that the arbitrator’s decision did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement and that the award exceeded the arbitrator’s authority.  Garvey, 203 F.3d at 587.  
 88. Id.  The district court dismissed the matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.  The 
court concluded that Garvey failed to meet the requirements of jurisdiction under §301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, which governs suits by and against labor organizations.  Id.  See also, 
supra notes 40-42.  The court further stated that it did not “feel comfortable” disturbing the 
arbitrator’s decisions, concluding that “[the arbitrator] heard the case, and made his decision, and 
[the court thinks] it was correct.”  Garvey, 203 F.3d at 587. 
 89. Id. 
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The court of appeals reversed and remanded the district court’s 
decision with directions to vacate the award.90  In reviewing Garvey’s 
challenge of the arbitrator’s award, the court took into consideration the 
contradictions of the arbitrator’s decision in Garvey’s claim and in the 
previous collusion hearings held in 1986.91  The Court of Appeals held 
that Roberts’ award should be vacated.92 
Following the court of appeals decision, the District Court for the 
Central District of California granted Garvey’s motion to vacate and 
proceeded to remand the case to the Arbitration Panel for de novo 
arbitration hearings.93  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 90. Garvey, 203 F.3d at 589.  In its analysis, the court initially stated that Garvey’s motion to 
vacate the arbitration award was in fact proper under Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act.  Id. at 588.  The court acknowledged that, taken alone, the Framework was not an 
agreement between an employer and a labor organization.  Id. at 587.  Rather, the Framework was a 
set of rules and procedures developed pursuant to the Global Settlement Agreement between the 
Clubs (employer) and the Association (labor organization) designed as a means to remedy the 
employer’s breach of the collective bargaining agreement as was established by the collusion 
hearings.  Id. at 587-88.  Garvey’s right to payment for alleged damages caused by the Club’s 
collusion arose from the collective bargaining agreement and was therefore proper under Section 
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.  Garvey, 203 F.3d at 587-88. 
 91.  Id. at 590.  The court noted that Smith had testified on behalf of the owners in the 1986 
collusion hearings and was now the key witness in Garvey’s claim for damages based on collusion.  
Id.  The court then placed emphasis on the fact that the same arbitrator participated in both decisions 
in which Smith testified.  Id.  The court stated “[i]n spite of [the arbitrator’s] determination in the 
earlier arbitration that the testimony of the owners (including Smith) had been false, and in spite of 
the fact that the owners’ testimony had been deliberately designed to cover-up their invidious 
scheme, the arbitrator rejected Garvey’s claim on the ground that Smith’s 1986 testimony had, in 
effect, been truthful.”  Id.  Judge Steven Reinhardt questioned how the arbitrator could rely on 
Smith’s 1986 testimony because much of it was to found to be false.  Savage, supra note 80. 
 92  Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2000).  The court stated that, based on the 
circumstances surrounding this case, the arbitrator’s decision as to Garvey’s claim was “completely 
inexplicable and border[ed] on the irrational.”  Id. at 590.  Taking into account the professional 
experience of the arbitrator, the court felt the only explanation for the decision was “his desire to 
dispense his own brand of industrial justice.”  Id. at 590-91.  In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge 
Hawkins stated that 
[N]o standard of review, no rule of deference is so slavish as to require [the reviewing 
court] to accept the conclusion of an arbitrator who says, in effect, “You lied before 
when you said there was no collusion, and I refused to rely on those lies in finding that 
there was collusion; but now that you are telling me that you did lie, that there really was 
collusion, I refuse to believe you.” 
Id. at 594. 
 93. Garvey v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, No. CV 97-05643 & CV 99-11774, 2000 
U.S. Dist.  LEXIS 20762, at *4  (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2000).  Garvey objected to this ruling, arguing 
that in reversing the court’s denial of the motion to vacate, the Ninth Circuit found that a contract 
existed between the San Diego Padres and Garvey.  Id. at *3.  The district court declined to enter 
judgment in favor of Garvey, reasoning that the Ninth Circuit had not instructed it to do so and that 
entering judgment for Garvey “would improperly substitute a judicial determination for the 
arbitrator’s decision.” Id. at *4.  Garvey appealed this ruling.  Garvey v. Major League Baseball 
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reversed and remanded to the district court with specific directions.94  
The Major League Baseball Player’s Association then petitioned for writ 
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which the Court 
granted.95 
C.  Supreme Court Decision 
In a brief and unsigned opinion, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.96  
First, the Supreme Court stated that the court of appeals erred in 
reversing the district court’s denial of Garvey’s motion to vacate the 
arbitration award.97  In so holding, the Supreme Court concluded that a 
reviewing court’s disagreement with an arbitrator’s factual findings is 
insufficient grounds for vacating an arbitration award.98 
Secondly, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals “erred 
further in directing that judgment be entered in Garvey’s favor.”99  The 
                                                                                                                                 
Players Ass’n, No. 00-56080, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31918, at *5 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000). 
 94. Id.  The court concluded that “[t]he only question on appeal to this court was the propriety 
of the result reached by the arbitrator on a full and fair record.”  Id. at *4.  Therefore, because the 
court’s previous decision on this matter found the arbitrator’s ruling against Garvey to be in error, 
the only possible result was an award in Garvey’s favor.  Id. at *4.  The court specifically directed 
the district court to remand the case to the Arbitration Panel with instructions to enter an award in 
favor of Garvey.  Id. 
 95. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 1005 (2001).  The 
Association’s main argument was that the Ninth Circuit “overstepped its bounds and wrongfully 
interfered in a dispute that was to be resolved by arbitration, and not courts.”  Savage, supra note 
80. 
 96. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 512 (2001).  The Court 
held that the court of appeals erred in two different respects in its ruling.  Id. 
 97. Id. at 511.  The Court reemphasized the judiciary’s limited role in reviewing the merits of 
an arbitration award.  Id. at 510.  See also supra notes 43-49. 
 98. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 510.  The Court stated that the court of 
appeals “recited” the principles established in prior Supreme Court decisions relating to the extreme 
judicial deference given to arbitration awards, but that “[the court of appeals’] application of [the 
principles was] nothing short of baffling.”  Id.  The Court felt that the court of appeals overturned 
the arbitrator’s decision because they did not agree with his factual findings relating to the issue of 
Smith’s credibility.  Id.  Even if the arbitrator had committed “serious error,” a court is not justified 
in overturning a decision as long as the arbitrator is construing the contract and acting within the 
scope of his authority.  Id.  (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union, v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 
(1987)).  In a footnote to its ruling, the Supreme Court stated that there was no serious error 
committed by the arbitrator.  Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 511 n.2.  The Court 
reasoned that “[t]he fact that an earlier panel of arbitrators rejected the owners’ testimony as a 
whole does not compel the conclusion that the panel found Smith’s specific statements with respect 
to Garvey to be false.”  Id.  The Court also stated that a plausible explanation for the arbitrator’s 
apparent contradictory decisions was that he found Smith to be an unreliable witness and that 
without any other corroborating evidence, Garvey failed to show that the Padres had in fact offered 
to extend his contract.  Id. 
 99. Id. at 511. 
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Court reasoned that “established law ordinarily precludes a court from 
resolving the merits of the parties’ dispute on the basis of its own factual 
determinations, no matter how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision.”100  
The Court noted that “[t]he court of appeals usurped the arbitrator’s role 
by resolving the dispute and barring further proceedings, a result at odds 
with this governing law.”101 
Justice Ginsberg submitted a concurring opinion.102  In her opinion, 
Justice Ginsberg stated that the court of appeals should not have 
“disturbed the arbitrator’s award.”103  She concluded that this was all the 
Court needed to hold in order to “set this case straight.”104 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens disagreed with the 
Court’s holding that even if an arbitrator’s award is found to be in error, 
the only course for a reviewing court to take is to remand the matter for 
another arbitration.105  Justice Stevens concluded his dissent by attacking 
the vagueness of the majority’s holding in this case.106 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 100. Id. (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.10 (1987)). 
 101. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 511.  The Court concluded that even if 
there had been a reason to vacate the arbitration award, the proper procedure was to remand the case 
for de novo hearings and not to direct the court to enter a judgment in favor of one of the parties.  
Id.  The Court reasoned that “[i]f a remand is appropriate even when the arbitrator’s award has been 
set aside for ‘procedural aberrations’ that constitute ‘affirmative misconduct,’ it follows that a 
remand ordinarily will be appropriate when the arbitrator simply made factual findings that the 
reviewing court perceives as ‘irrational.’”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Garvey’s lawyer, Neil 
Papiano, has interpreted the Court’s decision as indicating that a court should not make the decision 
in this case, but that the case should go back to an arbitrator to make a decision.  Savage, supra note 
80.  Despite this unfavorable ruling, Garvey is planning to return to an arbitrator to attempt to seek 
$3.2 million that he claims was wrongfully withheld by the Padres.  Id.  Garvey’s attorneys have 
asked that a new arbitrator, George Nicolau, hold a new hearing on whether former Padres’ 
president Ballard Smith withdrew a $3 million contract extension to Steve Garvey because of 
collusion.  Garvey seeking another chance, THE SAN-DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 9, 2001, at D6 
(discussing Garvey’s plans after the adverse Supreme Court ruling). 
 102. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 512. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 513.  Justice Stevens felt that this conclusion is not compelled by any prior cases 
and is not convincing because the Court did not provide any analysis or support for its holding.  
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 513.  He also vehemently objected to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling to decide this case without the benefit of briefing or oral argument.  Id.  He 
stated that the court of appeals had examined the record, obtained briefing and heard oral arguments 
prior to reaching its decision that the arbitrator’s findings were irrational, implying the Supreme 
Court’s decision may have been different if the Court had done its own review of the record prior to 
issuing its opinion.  Id. 
 106. Id. at 513, n.1.  Justice Stevens felt that the majority’s holding was ambiguous as to why 
they overturned the court of appeals decision to set aside the arbitration award, stating that “it is 
unclear whether the majority is saying that a court may never set aside an arbitration award because 
of a factual error, no matter how perverse, or whether the Court merely holds that the error in this 
20
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
An umpire, like an arbitrator, should not be overruled on a close 
pitch, but this “pitch [was] so far outside the strike zone that it is 
unworthy of deference, however defined.”107 
A.  The Garvey Decision 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n v. Garvey reaffirmed the unique role of labor arbitration in this 
country.108  In the Garvey decision, the Court reiterated the well-known 
principles of previous labor arbitration cases, which established the 
extremely limited role of courts reviewing arbitration awards.109  By 
upholding the arbitrator’s denial of Garvey’s claim, the Court 
emphasized that a reviewing court’s disagreement with an arbitrator’s 
factual findings are insufficient grounds for vacating an award.110 
The Supreme Court addressed two issues in the Garvey decision.111  
The Court first discussed the court of appeals decision to reverse the 
denial of Garvey’s claim by the district court.112  The second issue 
focused on by the Court was the court of appeals decision to enter 
judgment in favor of Garvey.113  There is, however, no clear way to 
                                                                                                                                 
case was not sufficiently severe to allow a court to take that step.” Id. 
 107. Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 594 (9th Cir. 2000).  Judge Hawkins made this 
statement in his concurring opinion in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
decision of the district court denying baseball player Steve Garvey’s claim for vacation of an 
arbitration award.  Id.  Judge Hawkins compared the court’s role in reviewing arbitration awards to 
reviewing an umpire’s calls on the baseball field.  Id. at 592-94.  He acknowledged the high level of 
deference normally accorded such decisions in both situations but believed that when either an 
arbitration award or a call on the baseball field is “so clearly and plainly wrong they cannot be 
rationally explained,” either decision should be overturned.  Id. at 592. 
 108. See supra notes 96-106. 
 109. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 509-10 (2001).  The Court first 
discussed its prior decision in United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco.  Id.  For a thorough 
discussion of this decision, see supra notes 47-49.  The Court then discussed the Steelworkers 
Trilogy, in which the Court first defined the original basis for judicial review of arbitration awards.  
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 509.  See supra notes 43-46 for a discussion of 
the Steelworkers Trilogy cases.  For a brief summation of the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Steelworkers Trilogy, see Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of the Law of Labor Arbitration and 
Commercial Arbitration: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 781, 791-801 (2000) 
(arguing that the distinctions made between labor arbitration and commercial arbitration should be 
vacated and the laws of each division unified). 
 110. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 510. 
 111. Id. at 510-11.  In its decision, the Supreme Court found two errors in the court of appeals 
decision.  Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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discern the precise reason that the Supreme Court reversed the decision 
of the court of appeals.114  This uncertainty in the Court’s decision may 
lead to differing interpretations of the case.115 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 114. It is unclear if either one of these errors alone or the combination of both errors caused the 
Court to reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  See id. at 510-11.  The Court did not devote 
considerable time to either issue.  See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 510-11 
(2001).  The Court reiterated the extremely limited scope of judicial review of arbitration awards.  
Id. at 509.  The Court recognized that the court of appeals also recited these principles, “but [found] 
its application of them nothing short of baffling.”  Id. at 510.  The Court then focused one paragraph 
of the decision on the court of appeals’ failure to remand the case to the arbitrator for further 
proceedings and its order that judgment be entered in Garvey’s favor.  Id. at 510-11.  Finding that 
the court of appeals had “usurped the arbitrator’s role by resolving the dispute and barring further 
proceedings,” the Court stated that this is inconsistent with the governing law.  Id. at 511.  In his 
dissent, however, Justice Stevens could not find any precedent for this holding.  Id. at 512.  The 
Court may have entered the same ruling even if the court of appeals’ remand procedures had been 
correct.  See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow of Public 
Courts: The Autonomy of Workplace Arbitration Systems, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 40 
(2001) (discussing the Garvey case as standing for the proposition that federal courts are to refrain 
from second guessing fact findings made by an arbitrator); Barbara K. Bucholtz, Symposium: 2000-
2001 Supreme Court Review: Gestalt Flips by an Acrobatic Supreme Court and the Business-
Related Cases on its 2000-2001 Docket, 37 TULSA L. J. 305, 320 (2001) (stating that the Garvey 
case is “thus, another brick in the wall protecting arbitration from judicial review”).  It is probably 
safe to assume that the court of appeals’ decision to vacate the arbitrator’s award—because they 
believed the arbitrator “dispensed his own brand of industrial justice”—was the principal reason the 
Supreme Court reversed the decision.  Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 589 (9th Cir. 2000).  But, 
as noted above, the exact reason is unclear from the Supreme Court opinion. See Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 510-11.  For a thorough discussion of the court of appeals 
decision, see supra notes 90-95. 
  But see Justice Stevens’ dissent in the Garvey decision.  Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 508, n.1.  Justice Stevens interpreted the Court’s holding as being ambiguous as 
to why they overturned the court of appeals’ decision.  Id.  The holding in the Garvey case could be 
interpreted as indicating that a court may never, under any circumstances, vacate an arbitration 
award because of a factual error.  Id.  But the Court’s holding could also be understood as indicating 
that the error committed by the arbitrator in this case was not severe enough to allow the Court to 
vacate the award.  Id. 
 115. See Justice Steven’s dissent, supra note 105-106.  It is possible that lower courts may 
interpret the decision as further enforcing the limited scope of judicial review.  See Shait v. 
Millennium Broadway Hotel, 00 Civ. 5584 (GEL), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6575, at *31 (S.D.N.Y.  
May 18, 2001) (holding that review of arbitration decisions is extremely limited).  The  Court’s 
decision emphasizes more heavily the narrow scope of judicial review of arbitration awards rather 
than proper remand procedures.  Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 509-11.  Lower 
courts, however, could interpret the decision as defining the proper remand procedures when an 
arbitration award can properly be vacated.  Id. at 511.  This ambiguity in the exact reason for the 
Supreme Court’s decision may lead to even more confusion in the lower courts with regard to 
judicial review of arbitration awards.  See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Beer Drivers, Local Union No. 
744, No. 00-4089, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 2409, at *24 (7th Cir.  Feb. 15, 2002) (citing Garvey in 
its decision to vacate an arbitration award where the arbitrator committed serious error).  As an 
example of this possible confusion, Garvey’s lawyer stated that his interpretation of the Supreme 
Court decision is that “instead of the court making the decision, it should go back to the arbitrator.”  
Savage, supra note 80.  This may indicate that Garvey interprets the Supreme Court decision as 
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The Court enumerated the well-established principles of judicial 
review, but did not necessarily apply them to the facts of the Garvey 
case.116  The arbitrator’s decision to deny Garvey’s claim for damages is 
only discussed briefly in a footnote to the opinion.117  The Supreme 
Court’s brief dismissal of the discrepancies in Smith’s testimony and the 
arbitrator’s rulings could indicate that the Court felt it did not warrant 
significant discussion in order to properly decide the case.118 
                                                                                                                                 
focusing more on the court of appeals’ remand procedures, rather than its expanded judicial review.  
See id. 
  Some recent cases, however, have cited the Garvey case as reinforcing the narrow scope 
of judicial review of arbitration awards.  See, e.g., Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry. Co. v. Int’l 
Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, No. 00-3564, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19336, at *6 (8th Cir.  Aug. 
30, 2001) (remanding the case for further arbitration); Morris v. UPS, Local 804, ’98 Civ. 
7353(KMW)(RLE), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8206, at *16 (S.D.N.Y.  June 13, 2001) (holding that a 
court may not substitute its judgment for that of an arbitrator).  See also Mark Berger, Arbitration’s 
Grand Slam Victory in the Supreme Court’s 2000-2001 Term, 72 PA. BAR ASSN. QUARTERLY 175, 
179 (2001) (stating that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions (including Garvey) are likely to 
reverse the trend of losing parties petitioning the courts to vacate arbitration awards). 
 116. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. 504, 509.  See also supra note 109. 
 117. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 511 n.2.  The major issue facing the 
court of appeals was the discrepancies in the arbitrator’s two rulings.  Garvey, 203 F.3d at 590.  The 
focus was on Smith’s testimony.  Id.  In the original collusion hearings, Smith testified that the 
Clubs did not engage in collusion in order to depress players’ salaries.  Id.  Then, in Garvey’s 
hearing, Smith produced a letter stating that he had offered a contract extension to Garvey, but 
subsequently withdrew the offer because of collusion.  Id.  In the first hearing, the arbitrator 
believed that Smith was lying and found the Clubs guilty of collusion.  Id.  In Garvey’s hearing, 
however, the arbitrator found that Smith was now lying when he admitted that collusion caused the 
Padres to withdraw the contract offer to Garvey.  Id.  This discrepancy appears to be the underlying 
basis for the court of appeals decision to vacate the arbitration award.  Id.  See supra notes 90-94. 
  The court of appeals discussed this issue at length in its opinion.  Garvey v. Roberts, 203 
F.3d 580, 589-92 (9th Cir. 2000).  The Supreme Court paid little attention to this important issue, 
only discussing it in a footnote to the case.  Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 511 
n.2.  The Court accepted the arbitrator’s determination that Smith was an unreliable witness and 
that, without corroborating evidence, Garvey failed to show that the Padres had offered to extend his 
contract.  Id.  Even if this analysis was unpersuasive to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court 
believed the arbitrator’s decision did not qualify as serious, irrational, or inexplicable error.  Id.  The 
Court then stated, “[a]ny such error would not justify the actions taken by the [c]ourt [of appeals].”  
Id. 
 118. It is possible that the Court was making a broad and defining statement in regard to 
judicial review of arbitration awards: courts should not review them.  See id.  If this is the 
underlying premise of the Court’s decision here, the reason the Court did not devote considerable 
time to the Smith testimony may be because there was nothing to discuss.  See id. at 511 n.2.  
Finding that the court of appeals disagreed with the arbitrator’s decision and thus vacated his award, 
the Supreme Court emphasized that this is not an acceptable ground for vacating an arbitration 
award and the facts of Garvey’s situation were irrelevant to the outcome of the case.  Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 510.  One commentator believes that this ruling adds “potency” 
to the arbitral process and will most likely be cited in support of the fundamental proposition that 
courts should refrain from overseeing the merits of rulings, a proposition already well established in 
most states.  Marshall H. Tanick, The Year of The Arbitrator: Upholding the Arbitral Process, 58-
NOV BENCH & B. MINN. 27, 29 (2001). 
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B.  Ambiguities in the Current Law of Vacatur of Arbitration Awards 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n v. Garvey indicates that the Court believes the current scope of 
judicial review available for arbitration awards is adequate.119  However, 
over forty years have passed since the Supreme Court first addressed the 
standards for vacatur of labor arbitration awards in the Steelworkers 
Trilogy.120  Since those initial cases were decided, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 119. Elizabeth H. Murphy, Arbitration at Work: The California and U.S. Supreme Courts have 
Endorsed Mandatory Employment Arbitration Agreements—Provided That Employees’ Due 
Process Rights are Protected, 24–NOV. L.A. LAW. 27, 28 (2001). 
 120. Hayford, supra note 109, at 825.  The initial principles laid down by the Supreme Court in 
the Steelworkers Trilogy and the cases following it seemed clear that there are only two grounds for 
vacating a labor arbitration award.  Id.  The first ground for vacating an arbitration award is 
violation of public policy.  W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber, 461 U.S. 
757, 766 (1983).  See also supra note 63.  Other issues, such as findings of fact, interpretation of the 
contract, and application of that language to the facts of each case, are to be left solely to the 
arbitrator.  Hayford, supra note 109, at 815. 
  The second ground is failure of the award to draw its essence form the collective 
bargaining agreement.  United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 
(1960).  The Supreme Court rejected the argument that an incorrect arbitral interpretation of a 
disputed contract provision can be deemed a failure of the arbitration award to draw its essence 
from the contract.  Stephen L. Hayford, The Federal Arbitration Act: Key to Stabilizing and 
Strengthening the Law of Labor Arbitration, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 521, 559 (2000).  The 
reasoning behind this rejection was that if this standard were upheld, it would require courts to 
review the merits of every construct of the contract by the arbitrator.  Id.  Such a review of the 
merits would, in the Court’s opinion, make meaningless the parties’ bargain for a final and binding 
decision by arbitration.  Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 589-99.  Cases subsequent to the 
Steelworkers Trilogy do not support the view that the Supreme Court interprets the “essence” 
standard as sanctioning any judicial intrusion into merits of challenged arbitration awards even 
where gross error is alleged.  Hayford, supra, at 560.  See also supra note 60.  For a further 
discussion of the “essence” standard, see Timothy J. Heinsz, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration 
Awards: The Enterprise Wheel Goes Around and Around, 52 MO. L. REV. 243, 248-56 (1987). 
  Some commentators, however, have found the “essence” test laid down by the Supreme 
Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy unworkable.  See Edgar A. Jones, Jr., “His Own Brand of 
Industrial Justice”: The Stalking Horse of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 30 UCLA L. REV. 
881, 885 (1983).  This test is unworkable because the Court has stated that judges must not allow 
arbitrators to stray beyond the parameters of the essence of collective bargaining agreements in 
fashioning arbitration awards.  Id. at 884-85.  But the Court has also said that the parties’ chosen 
arbitrators are more aware than are judges of the parties’ intent and needs that constitute that 
“essence.” Id. at 884-85.  It is virtually impossible to define the essence of a collective bargaining 
agreement so as to enable a reviewing court to differentiate between the correct brand of justice 
allowable for an arbitrator to dispense.  Id. at 887. 
  Other critics of the “essence” standard have noted that the Supreme Court does not 
indicate exactly how much deference is to be given arbitration awards.  See Clyde W. Summers, The 
Trilogy and Its Offspring Revisited: It’s a Contract, Stupid, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 1021, 1021 (1993).  
The federal circuit courts have disagreed over interpretations of the “essence” standard in part 
because of the Supreme Court’s vague standards laid down in the Steelworkers Trilogy.  Id.  The 
Court’s description of the character of collective bargaining agreements, the function of arbitration 
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has done little, if anything, to further clarify these vacatur standards.121  
As a result of this lack of clarity, the federal circuit courts have applied 
their own interpretations of the Supreme Court principles to vacate 
arbitration awards.122 
                                                                                                                                 
in the collective bargaining system, and the parties’ confidence in the competence of arbitrators 
carries a clear message that courts should give deference, but not total deference, to arbitration and 
arbitrator’s awards.  Id. Therefore, there is no clear definition of “essence” and “deference” for the 
circuit courts to follow when asked to review an arbitration award.  Id.  The Supreme Court has left 
the courts to formulate their own interpretations of these standards.  Id.  As one commentator has 
stated, “[o]ne man’s essence may be another man’s (or a court’s) nonsense.”  David E. Feller, Labor 
Arbitration: Past, Present, and Future: Taft and Hartley Vindicated: The Curious History of Review 
of Labor Arbitration Awards, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 296, 302 (1998). 
 121. Hayford, supra note 109, at 825.  The law of vacatur of labor arbitration awards, built 
upon the ambiguities of the Steelworkers Trilogy and the resulting inconsistencies in the circuit 
courts, is no clearer today than it was in 1960.  Id. at 826.  What is lacking is a clearly defined 
standard that allows for a substantive review of an arbitration award without compromising the 
strong policy favoring arbitral finality.  Marcus Mungioli, Comment, The Manifest Disregard of the 
Law Standard: A Vehicle for Modernization of the Federal Arbitration Act, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J.  
1079, 1117 (2000). 
  Other commentators have noted the problems with the ambiguities in the Supreme Court’s 
holdings on the subject of judicial review of labor arbitration awards.  See Gould, supra note 29.  
Mr. Gould believes that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Enterprise was intended to eliminate or 
diminish challenges to arbitral awards but has failed.  Id. at 472.  For example, the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit commented: 
It is a firm principle of federal labor law that where parties agree to submit a dispute to 
binding arbitration, absent unusual circumstances, they are bound by the outcome of said 
proceedings. . . .  Yet we are, with exasperating frequency, confronted by challenges to 
such decisions, brought by parties who are apparently still under the delusion that, as a 
matter of course, the losing party is entitled to appeal to the courts any adverse ruling by 
an arbitrator. 
Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs., Inc. v. Asociacion De Empleados De Casino De Puerto Rico, 821 
F.2d 60, 61 (1st Cir.  1987).  Mr. Gould, however, feels that losing parties in the initial arbitration 
proceedings are not the only ones to blame for the increasing number of arbitration challenges 
brought to courts.  Gould, supra note 29, at 472.  Reaffirmance of the Steelworkers Trilogy and 
limited expansion of the Trilogy’s principles, with new exceptions to the rule promoting finality of 
arbitration awards, has only invited more litigation and judicial contests to arbitration awards.  Id. 
  It appears that the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the standards laid down in the 
Steelworkers Trilogy in its subsequent decision in Misco.  See supra notes 47-49.  Commentators, 
however, note that this decision, like the decisions in the Steelworkers Trilogy, “is not sufficiently 
clear or ambitious.”  See Gould, supra note 29, at 495.  The decision in Misco has led a large 
number of circuits to approve or to provide for the vacatur of arbitral awards on both public policy 
and contract construction grounds, despite the Court’s language about the need for finality in 
arbitration awards.  Id. 
 122. Hayford, supra note 109, at 825.  The circuit courts have been unable to formulate a clear, 
bright-line test that facilitates a consistent, predictable application on a case-by-case basis.  Id. at 
816.  These courts have employed a variety of labels to determine if an arbitration award in fact 
“draws its essence” from the agreement and are more willing to scrutinize challenged awards for 
errors.  Id. at 815.  The opinions of several circuit courts of appeals consistently demonstrate that 
these courts are unable to articulate and apply the various non-statutory grounds for vacatur in a 
manner that remains loyal to the “essence” construct.  Hayford, supra note 109, at 560.  In doing so, 
one commentator argues that the circuit courts are slowly “vitiating the unequivocal command of 
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C.  The Need for Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards 
The Supreme Court declined to clarify or expand the scope of 
judicial review of labor arbitration awards in the Garvey decision.123  As 
a result, the Garvey decision has effectively done nothing to add to the 
field of judicial review of labor arbitration awards.124  In this case, the 
                                                                                                                                 
the Supreme Court” that labor arbitration awards are not subject to vacatur because of arbitral errors 
of contract interpretation or fact.”  Id. at 561.  The unwillingness of judges to let stand what they 
perceive to be egregiously flawed decisions has destabilized labor arbitration by stripping it of its 
finality.  Id. at 564.  This inconsistency in the circuit courts is also evident in the varying 
interpretations of the public policy exception by the courts.  See supra note 65 and accompanying 
text. 
  Despite courts expressing their reluctance to review arbitration awards, judicial review is 
becoming more prevalent because an increasing number of disputes are being arbitrated and because 
most circuits have expanded their scope of review.  Milam, supra note 59, at 705-06.  This 
confusion has led to circuit courts formulating their own interpretations of the “essence” standard.  
See, e.g., Bruce Hardwood Floors v. UBC, Southern Council of Industrial Workers, Local No. 2713, 
103 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1997) (vacating an arbitration award based on the court’s own 
independent interpretation of the relevant contract language); Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers’ Union, 
Inc., 118 F.3d 841, 844 (1st Cir. 1997) (permitting judicial tampering of arbitration awards if it can 
be shown that the arbitrator acted in a way for which neither party could have bargained); U.S. 
Postal Serv. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that an 
arbitration award that is “arbitrary and capricious” does not draw its essence from the collective 
bargaining agreement). 
  The federal courts seem to be moving towards a broader standard of review and a greater 
willingness to set aside arbitration awards that courts find to be displeasing.  See Coleman & 
Coleman, supra note 30, at 20.  The judicial expansion of the scope of review of arbitration awards 
may indicate the desire of judges to prevent injustice in an arbitration proceeding where gross errors 
or mistakes may have occurred.  Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for 
Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 833-34 (1996).  The numerous 
judicially created non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards evidence this.  See Hayford, 
supra at 763-98.  These grounds include: (1) “manifest disregard” of the law, (2) conflict with a 
strong public policy, (3) an award that is “arbitrary and capricious or “completely irrational,” and 
(4) failure of an award to “draw its essence” from the parties’ underlying contract.  Stephen A. 
Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Arbitral Error—An Option to Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 103, 110 (1997) (discussing a proposed alternative for parties who would like legally 
correct arbitral awards but are not willing to subject the award to substantive judicial review).  The 
result of these vague and confusing judicially created standards for review is that losing parties in 
arbitration proceedings often attempt to overturn the award on one of these imprecise grounds, even 
though such attempts are almost always futile.  Id.  Despite the extremely low rate of success 
associated with such appeals, parties continue to petition courts to vacate arbitration awards, 
resulting in arbitration and litigation, rather than arbitration instead of litigation.  See id. (emphasis 
added). 
 123. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 510-11 (2001).  Though 
this exact issue is not discussed by the Court, it can probably be assumed that Garvey argued that 
the scope of judicial review should be broadened from its current standard, which would have 
enabled the Supreme Court to vacate the arbitrator’s award. 
 124. Until the Supreme Court clarifies its vacatur standards, the decision in Garvey may aid in 
destabilizing the arbitration process.  See Hayford, supra note 109, at 825.  Mr. Hayford argues that 
with the lack of clarity of vacatur standards, the growing number of challenges to arbitration 
awards, and the willingness of courts to overturn awards when they find the results troubling 
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Court had an opportunity to expand the scope of judicial review, which 
would be advantageous to all parties involved in future arbitration 
proceedings.125 
Advocates of expanding the scope of judicial review126 advance 
several valid arguments which the Supreme Court should consider the 
next time it is faced with a situation similar to Garvey’s.  For instance, 
when parties, such as an employer and union, negotiate a collective 
bargaining agreement, they expect that bargain to be protected.127  The 
only way the parties’ bargain can be fully protected is by expanding 
judicial scrutiny beyond what is currently afforded courts in reviewing 
arbitration awards.128 
Others advocates advance a more formalistic argument based on the 
United States Constitution for expanding judicial review of arbitration 
awards.129  It is argued that the Constitution specifically vests the 
judicial power of the United States in the federal courts, not in 
                                                                                                                                 
contribute to destabilization of the arbitration process.  Id.  The willingness of lower courts to reject 
arbitration awards in debatable circumstances provide ammunition to parties who may wish to use 
the courts to overturn awards.  Id.  See also supra note 122 discussing the willingness of some 
circuit courts to vacate arbitration awards. 
 125. Numerous benefits to expanding the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards are 
identified by commentators.  See infra notes 126-43 and accompanying text. 
 126. For a brief summary of some court decisions upholding expanded judicial review, see 
Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 63 
ALB. L. REV. 241, 254-58 (1999). 
 127. Ray, supra note 8, at 2.  Judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards will aid in protecting the 
parties’ bargain from possible misreading by a labor arbitrator, who rarely has formal legal training.  
Id.  It is important to consider that federal judges are legally trained and are chosen through a 
careful and public selection process.  They deal regularly with a broad range of contract 
interpretation issues.  Id.  Therefore it would seem that parties would welcome the scrutiny of 
someone with such expansive legal experience as judges.  Id.  When parties enter into a contract to 
have disputes resolved by an arbitrator, they expect that the arbitrator will keep within limits, and if 
he or she does not, the court will then intervene to protect their bargain.  Summers, supra note 120, 
at 1021.  When an arbitrator’s decision is beyond the boundaries of what other arbitrators might 
decide, then the parties’ expectations have been defeated and the decision is not within the intent 
and purpose of the agreement to arbitrate.  Id. 
 128. Ray, supra note 8, at 2.  Protecting a party’s bargain raises the issue of parties contracting 
for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards.  See generally Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out 
of The Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.  225, 256 (1997) (arguing that a court has the power 
and obligation to give effect to an arbitral award that the parties intended the award to have, even if 
a court must conduct an expanded review as called for in the agreement); Sasser, supra note 32, at 
367 (arguing that parties should be able to contract for expanded judicial review of arbitration 
awards based on circuit court opinions and basic public policy reasons); Younger, supra note 126, at 
261 (warning parties to use caution before agreeing to expand the scope of judicial review in 
arbitration agreements). 
 129. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 56, at 759 (discussing the need for somewhat limited but 
broader judicial review). 
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arbitrators.130  Federal courts should review the merits of arbitration 
awards when these awards impinge on the judicial power granted by the 
United States Constitution.131 
Without broader judicial review of arbitration awards, there is a 
strong possibility that serious errors may go uncorrected.132  Allowing 
reviewing courts broader discretion in vacating arbitration awards can 
provide a losing party with a chance to secure the reversal of an 
erroneous arbitration decision.133  Opponents of expanding judicial 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 130. The United States Constitution states, “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . . establish.” U.S. 
CONST. art III, § 1. 
 131. Randall, supra note 56, at 759.  Arbitration cannot replace the courts, which are ultimately 
responsible for enforcing laws and safeguarding public interests.  Id.  Courts cannot permit 
violations of public policy, enforce illegal contracts, or otherwise condone illegal behavior, and thus 
should scrutinize arbitration awards more closely to prevent such problems and to protect public 
interests.  Id.  If courts could not vacate an award that conflicts with public policy or violates an 
important law or rule, then essentially, “[a]rbitration is above the law.”  LeRoy, supra note 114, at 
23. 
  Another formalistic argument made for expanding judicial review of arbitration awards 
was made by the dissent in a Supreme Court case.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 41 (1991).  Whatever the underlying merits of arbitration, Congress has simply not 
authorized its use in the employment law area.  Id.  It has been argued, however, that Section 301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act states that arbitration, rather than strikes and/or other 
measures, is the preferred method for settling industrial disputes.  See supra notes 40-42 and 
accompanying text. 
 132. Jay C. Carlisle, Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes Under New 
York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 95, 109 (1988) (citing 3 J. WEINSTEIN, H. 
KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE P3031.02 (1986)).  When a decision is made by a 
judge, rather than by an arbitrator, the likelihood that a dispute will be settled according to generally 
recognized and predictable rules of substantive law is greater.  Id.  Also, arbitrators, who are usually 
non-judicial personnel, may not be sufficiently trained to hear and determine all types of disputes 
that may arise.  Id. 
 133. Berger, supra note 30, at 256.  Advocates of broader judicial review question whether 
arbitrators as a class should be immune from judicial review when district court judges can be 
reversed by appellate courts for errors.  Id. Correcting errors in the labor arbitration process furthers 
the public interest in protection of bargains.  Id. at 257.  See also supra notes 127-28 for further 
discussion of protecting the parties’ bargain. 
  The Supreme Court has so limited judicial review that “arbitrators are a true black box.”  
Ralph A. Finizio et al., Arbitration, A Reappraisal, 3 NO. 18 LAWYERS J. 5, 13 (Sept. 7, 2001) 
(discussing the limitations of the arbitration process).  In this regard, arbitrators may resolve the 
dispute by any means appropriate with “virtually unfettered discretion.”  Id.  In some cases, unless 
the arbitration agreement specifically provides for limits on the arbitrator’s discretion, the arbitrator 
may not be bound to rule based upon the evidence presented or governing law.  Id.  Allowing 
arbitrators such extreme deference ignores the fact that some cases are too complex to be finally 
disposed of through the inadequate procedures of arbitration.  Robert N. Covington, Employment 
Arbitration After Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come To The United States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 345, 387 (1998) (discussing the possibility of the development of labor and employment 
courts in the United States).  One such case may be discrimination claims.  Id.  This argument, 
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review argue that the review process, based on any standard, undercuts 
the speed and finality that makes labor arbitration an ideal alternative to 
litigation.134  Advocates, however, assert that reviewing arbitration 
awards based on errors of law or fact would be less burdensome than a 
full trial.135 
Broadening the current standard of judicial review of arbitration 
awards may encourage parties to enter into arbitration agreements.136  By 
forcing parties to resort to alternative means of resolving disputes, the 
current standard of judicial review may actually disrupt labor 
management relations, rather than promote them.137 
Had the Supreme Court decided to expand the scope of judicial 
review of arbitration awards, the court of appeals decisions most likely 
would have been upheld.138  Broadening the scope of judicial review 
could have allowed the serious error committed by the arbitrator to be 
corrected.139  This would also have served to protect the bargain between 
                                                                                                                                 
however, has been made, and the Supreme Court rejected it.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991). 
 134. See Ray, supra note 8, at 2.  For a further discussion of arguments against expanding 
judicial review of arbitration awards, see infra notes 146-68. 
 135. See Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 29, at 247; Fils Et Cables D’Acier De Lens v. Midland 
Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y.  1984) (finding that reviewing an arbitrator’s 
findings for substantial evidence and legal validity is “far less searching and time consuming” than a 
full trial).  But see LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 706 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(declining to review an arbitration award based on errors of law and substantial facts because it 
would entail a huge review). 
 136. Berger, supra note 30 at 253.  The absolute finality of an arbitration decision may cause 
parties to be less willing to arbitrate disputes.  Id.  In effect, limiting judicial review of arbitration 
awards as narrowly as the Supreme Court presently does may cause fewer parties to agree to 
arbitrate.  Instead, they may choose to litigate grievances, causing even more congestion in the 
courts.  Id. 
 137. Id.  Without acceptable alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve grievances, 
parties may resort to economic weapons or litigation to settle many of their disagreements.  Id.  It 
has long been established that this narrow review of arbitration awards is in place in order to 
promote the federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration.  United Steelworkers v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).  Parties, however, may be less willing to 
arbitrate disputes, knowing that serious errors will go uncorrected by the courts.  See Torrington Co. 
v. Metal Prods. Workers’ Union Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 1966) (refusing to enforce 
an arbitration award reasoning that its decision to do so would “stimulate voluntary resort to labor 
arbitration”).  In effect, the narrow standard of review may serve to force parties to settle labor 
disputes by litigation, rather than arbitration, in order to be sure that serious errors will not be made.  
See Berger supra note 30, at 253 (discussing the possibility that non effective methods of alternative 
dispute resolution will lead to more parties engaging in litigation). 
 138. See Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging the limited 
scope of judicial review of arbitration awards, but holding that in this case, the arbitrator’s decision 
was “completely inexplicable and border[ed] on the irrational” and vacatur of the award was 
proper). 
 139. See Finizio, supra note 133, at 13 (discussing the limits of arbitration in that arbitrators 
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the Baseball Players Union and the Baseball Clubs.140  The players who 
were damaged by the collusion of the Clubs and their owners were 
entitled to damages as agreed upon in the Global Settlement Agreement 
and the Framework.141 
By declining to expand the scope of judicial review, the Supreme 
Court allowed the arbitrator to encroach upon the role of the judiciary 
and essentially failed to protect the interests of all baseball players 
damaged by the collusion.142  In order to sustain the vitality and 
efficiency of labor arbitration, the Supreme Court will need to address 
some of these persuasive arguments and reconsider expanding the 
current standard of judicial review.143 
D.  Maintaining Narrow Review of Arbitration Awards 
In the Garvey decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the limited 
role of courts in the process of labor arbitration.144  Although the Court 
did not specifically articulate its reasons for upholding the extremely 
limited scope of judicial review, several rationales for its continued 
existence have been advanced.145  The justifications suggested for 
maintaining a narrow standard of judicial review of arbitration awards 
presumably motivated the Supreme Court to reach its decision in 
Garvey. 
The foremost argument advanced for maintaining a narrow standard 
of judicial review of arbitration awards is based on the initial goals of 
                                                                                                                                 
are not required to follow the evidence presented or governing law).  Had the evidence presented 
bound the arbitrator in Garvey’s case, Garvey most likely would have prevailed.  See Garvey, 203 
F.3d at 594. 
 140. See Summers, supra note 120, at 1021 (discussing the fact that parties’ bargains are only 
protected when an arbitral decision is within the intent and purpose of the parties’ original 
agreement). 
 141. See supra note 79 for discussion of the Framework. 
 142. See Randall, supra note 56, at 759 (discussing the need for courts to review arbitration 
awards to prevent encroachment by the arbitrators on judicial power and to ensure representation of 
the general public interest). 
 143. However, if there is to be meaningful review of arbitration awards, there must be an 
adequate basis for review—either a record of the proceedings or, at a minimum, a statement by the 
arbitrator which reflects his or her factual findings and legal analysis.  Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration 
of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA 
LAB. L.J. 1, 47 (1996) (discussing the alternatives of policing agreements to arbitrate statutory 
employment claims for fairness and voluntariness). 
 144. See supra notes 108-14.  For a brief summary of court decisions declining to enforce 
expanded judicial review, see Younger, supra note 126, at 258-60. 
 145. See generally Ray, supra note 8, at 2; Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 29, at 247-50; Berger, 
supra note 30, at 246-54.  For more specific justifications, see infra notes 148-68 and accompanying 
text. 
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arbitration.146  Advocates argue that a narrow standard of review aids in 
promoting the finality of arbitration decisions.147  Loss of finality not 
only increases out of pocket expenses, but also results in substantial 
delay in the settlement of grievances.148 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 146. For a discussion of some of the reasons parties choose arbitration over litigation, see 
supra notes 28-30. A frequently cited benefit of arbitration is the informality of the process.  4 AM. 
JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 8 (1995).  Some advocates argue that by avoiding judicial 
inquiry into factual issues, such as whether the arbitrator’s findings of fact were supported by 
substantial evidence or clearly erroneous, it is hoped that the arbitration proceeding will not be 
conducted like a judicial trial and that the procedural efficiencies of arbitration will be preserved.  
Hochman, supra note 122, at 115.  Although giving the arbitrator the power to make unreviewable 
findings of fact may create a potential for abuse by an arbitrator bent on reaching a legally incorrect 
result, this minimal risk seems to be more than offset by the advantage of a summary judgment type 
of judicial review limited to correcting errors of law.  Id. 
 147. Elizabeth Tenorio, Note, Modifying the Standard of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration 
Awards: A Comparison to Administrative Review Hearings, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 245, 256 (1997).  
If the courts consider an arbitration decision final and binding on the parties, they will be less 
willing to spend a great deal of time and money trying to go to court to overturn the decision.  Id.  
Narrow review of arbitration awards will result in courts being faced with fewer cases to review, 
since a losing party will lack any incentive to litigate the validity of the arbitrator’s ruling.  Berger, 
supra note 30, at 256. 
  However, what may be gained by the informality and relative speed of arbitration 
proceedings may be offset by a perceived lack of due process.  Gary W. Flanagan, Expanded 
Grounds for Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 488, 495 
(2000).  In many arbitration proceedings, discovery is limited and arbitrators are sometimes less 
qualified than judges to handle the complexities of some cases.  Michele L. Giovagnoli, Comment, 
To Be or Not To Be?: Recent Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the Employment 
Arena, 64 UKMC L.  REV. 547, 575 (1996).  Also, some parties may feel at a financial disadvantage 
if they are required by the arbitration agreement to pay for half of the arbitrator’s time in order to 
bring a claim.  Flanagan, supra, at 495.  For a thorough discussion of the issue of due process and 
arbitration, see Jay E. Grenig, When Due Process is Due: The Courts and Labor Arbitration, 1995 
DET. C.L. REV. 889 (1995) (discussing the issue of due process arising under collective bargaining 
agreements in employee discharge cases involving major offenses). 
 148. Covington, supra note 133, at 387.  Allowing a broader standard of review will add 
significant costs to the arbitration process.  Ray, supra note 8, at 2.  Parties will spend money for the 
initial arbitration proceeding and then must pay court costs, including lawyer fees, in order to 
facilitate judicial review of an arbitration award.  Broader judicial review will result in delay of a 
resolution which means grievances will remain unresolved for longer periods of time and will leave 
the parties in a continued state of uncertainty.  Berger, supra note 30, at 252.  Appeals lead to delay 
and delay undercuts the entire labor arbitration process by threatening both the finality of the 
process and the positive labor relation benefits of a final decision.  Ray, supra note 13, at 65.  
Delays can cause uncertainty, interfere with the bargaining process, and undermine the union.  Ray, 
supra note 8, at 12. 
  Besides delaying a final resolution to a grievance, broad judicial review can also serve to 
complicate what is usually a fairly simple process.  Sasser, supra note 32, at 365.  For instance, if 
courts are able to review an arbitration award much more closely, arbitrators will have to make 
specific findings of law and fact in order to facilitate proper review by the courts.  Id.  Also, 
arbitrators will have to be available to testify before a reviewing court in the appeal of the award.  
Id. 
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Garvey’s claim was filed in 1996 and a final resolution was not 
reached until 2001, which substantially delayed the settlement of his 
grievance.149  If Garvey had recognized the extremely narrow judicial 
review of arbitration awards, he most likely would not have appealed the 
unfavorable arbitral award, saving all parties involved time and 
money.150  Presumably, the Supreme Court recognized that limited 
judicial review may promote finality of arbitration awards.151  Applying 
this principle in the Garvey decision, it is possible that the Court 
intended to reestablish this objective of arbitration and hoped to limit 
future litigation seeking to vacate or overturn arbitration awards.152 
Retaining a narrow scope of judicial review can also serve to 
preserve the integrity of the arbitration process.153  Advocates of narrow 
judicial review emphasize the importance of protecting the parties’ 
bargain in contracting for arbitration as a means of settling disputes.154  
                                                                                                                                 
 
 149. See Covington, supra note 133, at 387 (discussing the substantial delays imposed by 
appeals of arbitration awards by losing parties).  It may also be assumed that both Garvey and the 
Players Association expended considerable money on retaining counsel for the numerous appeals 
that followed Garvey’s initial claim.  See Berger, supra note 30, at 252.  Even after all of the money 
and time spent, the result of Garvey’s claim was obviously the same result as that rendered by the 
arbitrator.  See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 (2001). 
 150. See Tenorio, supra note 147, at 256 (discussing the disincentives of appealing arbitration 
awards under a narrow standard of judicial review).  See also notes 147-149 supra. 
 151. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 509-10. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 29, at 248.  Allowing for broader judicial review may add a 
redundant step to the arbitration process and bring parties to the table who do not trust arbitration as 
a final resolution forum and who would bring a case to court anyway.  Id. at 251.  Arbitration may 
be selected by the parties for many reasons, particularly because they are able to choose their own 
neutral third party to resolve the dispute.  See supra note 29.  Labor arbitrators, unlike judges, are 
selected by the parties themselves and are presumed to be experts in the narrow range of issues 
involved in interpreting labor contracts.  Ray, supra note 8, at 2.  On the other hand, federal judges 
are responsible for a broad range of legal areas and cannot quickly become experts in the “law of 
the shop.”  Id. 
  Judicial review of arbitration awards leads to delays, and delays destroy all the positive 
values implicit in the arbitration process.  Id. at 11.  Narrow review will also prevent management 
from using the opportunity of judicial review to frustrate the arbitration process.  Jiang-Schuerger, 
supra note 29, at 252-54.  A policy of deference will prevent labor and management from losing 
faith in the arbitration process as a result of continuing court reversals.  Berger, supra note 30, at 
277.  If courts were allowed broad discretion in overturning arbitration awards, many parties would 
view arbitration as useless because the decision of the arbitrator may not be final and binding.  Id. at 
278.  Bypassing the entire arbitration process will result in an increase in labor contract litigation.  
Id. 
 154. Davis, supra note 57, at 101.  Limiting the scope of judicial review promotes the 
fundamental policy of arbitration: honoring the contractual intent of the parties to the arbitration 
agreement.  Id.  The limited scope of review flows from the private nature of arbitration.  Id. at 86.  
A collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitration is an agreed upon substitute for labor 
and union strikes.  The parties receive what they bargain for when the arbitrator renders an award 
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Broad judicial review may serve to contravene the parties’ freedom of 
contract without any ground for doing so.155 
The Garvey decision arguably maintains the integrity of the 
arbitration process by its refusal to vacate an arbitration award that was 
arguably premised on serious error on the part of the arbitrator.156  After 
the original finding of collusion by the Clubs, the Major League 
Baseball Players Association and the Clubs entered into the Global 
Settlement Agreement.157  By this agreement, the parties contracted for 
an arbitrator to settle the claims of players injured by the collusion.158  
Presumably, the parties felt this was the best means for redressing the 
injuries that resulted from the collusion of the Clubs to depress player’s 
salaries.159  Therefore, the Supreme Court may have declined to vacate 
the arbitrator’s award or to broaden judicial review of such awards as a 
means of protecting the bargain struck between the Major League 
Baseball Players Association and the Clubs.160 
One final argument for preserving a narrow standard of judicial 
review relies on the legislation relating to arbitration.161  Both the 
Federal Arbitration Act162 and Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act163 establish a federal policy favoring arbitration as a 
means of resolving disputes.164  The Federal Arbitration Act lists four 
                                                                                                                                 
resolving their dispute.  Martin H. Milan & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A 
Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to 
Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1195 (1993).  Also, the parties have bargained for the interpretation 
of the arbitrator and only the arbitrator, not the interpretation of a judge, and allowing a court the 
final decision on the parties’ dispute ignores the parties’ bargain.  Ray, supra note 8, at 9.  
Therefore, an arbitrator’s final ruling fully provides the benefit of the parties’ bargain.  Id. at 10.  
Milan and Ladenson suggest that parties who may consider an award to be erroneous or 
unsatisfactory can try to correct the error in negotiations with the other party.  Milan, supra, at 1195. 
 155. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through 
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV.  703, 739 (1999).  Imposing judicial review of arbitrators’ legal 
rulings goes beyond contract law in adding an extra barrier to enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.  Id.  Courts should be reluctant to override an earlier commitment of both parties to the 
selection of a particular arbitrator as the articulator of their contractual obligations in order to relieve 
one party from an unsatisfactory result of that choice.  Jones, Jr., supra note 120, at 893. 
 156. See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 510-11 (2001). 
 157. See supra note 79. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 510.  Even Garvey has conceded 
that, though the Supreme Court’s ruling disappointed him, he understood that the Court was “trying 
to protect the arbitration process.”  Garvey Seeking Another Chance, THE SAN-DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, July 9, 2001, at D6. 
 161. See Hayford, supra note 109, at 890. 
 162. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text. 
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specific grounds for vacating an arbitration award,165 while Section 301 
does not list any grounds.  Therefore, advocates of narrow judicial 
review have argued that these federal statutes do not allow for expanding 
judicial review beyond those established by Congress.166 
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically articulate its 
reasons for refusing to overturn the arbitration award, it is reasonable to 
assume that some of the above arguments may have influenced its 
decision.167  The only rationale supplied by the Court was prior case law 
and precedent in which the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards 
was established as extremely narrow.168 
E.  Proposed Standard for Vacating the Arbitration Award in Garvey 
As previously stated, the Supreme Court declined to consider 
expanding the scope of judicial review in the Garvey case.169  The Court, 
however, should have considered an additional ground for vacating an 
arbitration award: the “completely irrational” standard.170  This standard 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 165. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Hayford, supra note 109, at 890.  Congress declined to authorize judicial reversal of 
challenged awards for arbitral error of fact, contract interpretation, or misapplication of law, by 
limiting the grounds for vacatur to four standards.  Id.  Clearly, it was the intent of Congress that the 
parties to a valid arbitration agreement who have had the benefit of a full and fair arbitration 
proceeding are not to be permitted to escape that bargain at the back end of the process, just because 
they are displeased with the result.  Id.  Also, Congress has not granted courts power to expand the 
grounds of vacatur of arbitration awards.  Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 29, at 248.  By explicitly 
listing four grounds upon which a federal court may vacate or modify an arbitration award, 
Congress intended to ensure the proper functioning of the arbitral process.  Id.  The creation and 
application of non-statutory standards of review of an arbitrator’s decision is inconsistent with the 
language of the federal statutes and is not supported by statutory command or by arbitration law.  Id. 
at 249. 
 167. For an empirical study of the frequency with which some of the above arguments are used 
by parties petitioning a court to vacate an arbitration award and how often federal courts accept 
these arguments, see LeRoy, supra note 114, at 49-91 (discussing empirical research of judicial 
review of workplace arbitration awards). 
 168. See supra note 109. 
 169. See supra notes 123-25. 
 170. See Hayford, supra note 109, at 878.  Courts have used this standard as a means of 
determining that the arbitrator’s decision does not draw its “essence” from the parties’ agreement.  
The Third Circuit, relying on the Steelworkers Trilogy and its own labor arbitration precedent, has 
stated that “an arbitrator’s award does not draw its essence from the agreement if the arbitrator’s 
interpretation of the contract cannot be rationally derived there from . . . an award may not stand if it 
does not meet the test of fundamental rationality.”  Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 
F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972).  The Ninth Circuit has held that “an arbitrator’s decision must be 
upheld unless it is ‘completely irrational.’”  French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 784 
F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986).  See also James E. Beckley, Embracing Irrationality: A Functional 
Test for Vacating Arbitration Awards, 1062 PLI/CORP 537, 545-47 (1998) (arguing that the 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss2/4
LIPINSKI1.DOC 4/7/03  12:54 PM 
2003] MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N V. GERVEY 359 
is similar in scope to the one advocated by Judge Joyce Kennard of the 
California Supreme Court, which she suggested is an “intermediate” 
position of judicial review of arbitration awards.171 
Despite narrow judicial review, some courts recognize the need to 
hold arbitrators to a standard of rationality.172  This standard requires 
that there be some support in the record for the arbitrator’s award.173 
Advocates of the “completely irrational” standard for vacating an 
arbitration award argue that this standard promotes the fundamental 
policy of arbitration: honoring the contractual intent of the parties to the 
arbitration agreement.174 
However, this standard can be utilized only when an arbitrator 
reveals his reasoning process, preferably in a written opinion.175  Written 
opinions are essential if courts are to exercise meaningful judicial review 
                                                                                                                                 
appropriate test for vacating arbitration awards is whether the award is “irrational”). 
 171. See Hochman, supra note 122, at 111 (citing Judge Joyce Kennard, Speech to the Section 
of Litigation of the American Bar Association (Apr. 19, 1997)).  According to Judge Kennard, 
“even in the absence of an agreement by the parties to allow substantive judicial review, arbitration 
awards which are ‘manifestly erroneous’ and cause a ‘substantial injustice’ should be subject to 
vacation by a court.”  Id. 
 172. Davis, supra note 57, at 101.  This standard applies primarily to findings of fact.  Id. at 
103. 
 173. Id. at 101.  The irrational standard vacates an award evincing an irrational interpretation, 
considering the magnitude and quality of the error, rather than the state of mind of the arbitrator.  Id. 
at 107. 
 174. Id. at 101.  This standard does not impose judicial intermeddling into the arbitration 
process.  Id.  Any party agreeing to arbitrate disputes with another expects the arbitrator to resolve 
the conflict reasonably.  Davis, supra note 57, at 101.  Parties should not be subject to an award so 
flawed that it is against the very principles the parties were attempting to resolve.  Mungioli, supra 
note 121, at 1120. 
  This standard, however, has not been widely accepted and has, in fact, been criticized.  
Hayford, supra note 109, at 878.  Critics indicate that the “completely irrational” standard allows 
for the intrusion of broad judicial review into the merits of challenged arbitration awards “deemed 
by a court to be grossly inaccurate on the facts or egregiously incorrect on the relevant contract 
language or law, without providing any concrete, objective guides to decision for the lower courts.”  
Id.  The “completely irrational” award standard may open the door to substantial judicial evaluation 
of the merits of arbitration awards by a court that is predisposed to engage in reviewing the merits 
when confronted with an award it believes to be grossly inaccurate or incorrect.  Hayford, supra 
note 122, at 793.  Also noted is that neither of the above Third and Ninth Circuit cases have been 
cited as authority for further integration of the “completely irrational” standard.  Id. 
 175. Davis, supra note 57, at 107.  Ordinarily, arbitrators are required to issue written awards, 
but they are not required to issue opinions explaining the rationale behind their decisions.  
Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public Law Arbitrators 
Should Be Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 
285, 297 (2000).  The Supreme Court has stated that arbitrators have no obligation to the court to 
give their reasons for an award.  United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
593, 598 (1960).  Not only do many arbitration awards contain no reasoned opinion, but in many 
cases, arbitrators are instructed not to give a reason for a decision.  Flanagan, supra note 147, at 
498. 
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of arbitral decisions, especially under the “completely irrational” 
standard.176 
In the Garvey case, the arbitrator issued an opinion explaining the 
reasoning for denying Garvey’s claim alleging that collusion prevented 
his contract from being extended.177  The arbitrator noted in his award 
the contradictions in Smith’s earlier testimony in the collusion hearings 
and in his present testimony for Garvey.178  Had the Supreme Court 
applied the “completely irrational” standard to the arbitrator’s findings 
of fact, it is obvious the arbitrator’s decision would have failed this 
standard.179 
The court of appeals found that the arbitrator’s rulings in the two 
separate hearings were “completely inexplicable and border[ed] on the 
irrational.”180  The players’ union and Garvey expected the arbitrator to 
resolve the claim reasonably, which, given the peculiar circumstances, 
he did not do.181  The only reference by the Supreme Court of any 
possible error on the part of the arbitrator was mentioned in a footnote at 
the end of the opinion.182  The Court stated that even if the arbitrator had 
committed an error in his disbelief of Smith’s testimony, it was not 
irrational or inexplicable, and would not justify the actions taken by the 
court of appeals.183  Had the Supreme Court looked more closely at the 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 176. Kaczmarek, supra note 175, at 323.  A coherent explanation makes it possible for a 
reviewing court to fully understand the dispute as well as identify and correct any erroneous 
decisions made by the arbitrator.  Id. 
 177. Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 586 (9th Cir. 2000).  The arbitrator’s award dedicated 
over five pages to discussion of Garvey’s claim and its denial by the Association.  Id. 
 178. Id.  The arbitrator indicated that on its face, Smith’s testimony supported Garvey’s claim 
for a contract extension, but that the shadow cast over his credibility, coupled with the absence of 
any other corroboration of a specific offer of a contract extension, compelled a finding that the 
Padres declined to extend his contract as a baseball judgment founded upon Garvey’s age and recent 
injury history.  Id.  See also supra notes 84-86.  This glaring contradiction in the arbitrator’s two 
decisions hardly seems rational. 
 179. See supra notes 85-86.  As the court of appeals noted, in the collusion hearing, the 
arbitrator found that Smith (and other club owners) were lying when they denied any collusion 
between baseball Clubs.  Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 591 (9th Cir.  2000).  In light of that 
conclusion, the arbitrator then determined that Smith was lying when he admitted to collusion by 
the Clubs as the reason for refusing to extend Garvey’s contract.  Id. 
 180. Id. at 590.  The court vacated the award, finding that the arbitrator “dispense[d] his own 
brand of industrial justice.” Id. at 590-91. 
 181. As Circuit Judge Hawkins pointed out in his concurring opinion, the court refused to 
accept the conclusion of the arbitrator, who, in effect, stated “You lied before when you said there 
was no collusion, and I refused to rely on those lies in finding that there was collusion; but now that 
you are telling me that you did lie, that there really was collusion, I refuse to believe you.”  Id. at 
594.  The Supreme Court did not fully consider the extenuating circumstances of this case. 
 182. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 n.2 (2001). 
 183. Id.  The Court stated that there was no serious error on the part of the arbitrator in this 
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arbitrator’s findings in the two proceedings, the irrationality would be 
apparent and his award should have been vacated.184 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Arbitration has become one of the most prevalent techniques of 
alternative dispute resolution,185 particularly in labor disputes arising 
under collective bargaining agreements.186  Congress and the Supreme 
Court have demonstrated their acceptance of arbitration by the 
establishment of statutes187 and legal principles that govern the 
arbitration process.188  In Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. 
Garvey, Garvey petitioned the Court to vacate an adverse arbitration 
award.189  The Supreme Court declined to vacate the arbitration award, 
as a further indication of its advocacy of arbitration as an alternative to 
litigation.190 
In the Garvey decision, the Supreme Court was confronted with 
three options: 1) Clarify the judicial review standards for arbitration 
awards;191 2) Expand the scope of judicial review of arbitration 
awards;192 or 3) Adopt the “completely irrational” standard for vacating 
an arbitration award.193  The Supreme Court declined to implement any 
of these options, thereby retaining the ambiguous standards of judicial 
                                                                                                                                 
case.  Id.  The Court accepted the arbitrator’s explanation for his decision that he found Smith to be 
an unreliable witness and that, in the absence of corroborating evidence, the arbitrator could only 
conclude that Garvey failed to show that the Padres had offered to extend his contract.  Id. 
 184. The Supreme Court did not extensively consider the arbitrator’s two conflicting decisions, 
which was the main thrust of the court of appeals decision.  Circuit Judge Hawkins also noted that 
the arbitrator had two options, either of which would have rendered his decision rational and 
entitled to court deference.  Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 594 (9th Cir. 2000).  First, the 
arbitrator could have accepted Smith’s testimony, essentially admitting that he had lied in the 
previous collusion hearings.  Id.  No reviewing court, applying even the most rigorous standard of 
review, would have found that decision irrational.  Id.  Secondly, had the arbitrator required Smith 
to testify under oath to the truthfulness of his statements admitting to collusion, the decision to deny 
Garvey’s claim may have been accepted as rational.  Id.  Instead, the arbitrator relied on Smith’s 
testimony under oath in the original collusion hearings and Smith’s letter, which was not given 
under oath.  Id.  Requiring Smith to testify under oath that the Clubs had colluded may have given 
more credibility to the arbitrator’s reasoning that Smith was not a believable witness.  Id. 
 185. See supra note 4. 
 186. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 10, 31-42 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 11, 43-49 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra notes 75-106 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 123-43 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text. 
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review of arbitration awards established over forty years ago.194  Had the 
Supreme Court clarified the current standards of vacatur, the disparities 
in circuit court decisions regarding vacatur of an arbitration award could 
be resolved.195  Expanding the scope of judicial review would have 
prevented the arbitrator from encroaching upon the role of the judiciary 
and served to protect the interests of all baseball players damaged by the 
collusion of the Clubs.196  Alternatively, adopting the “completely 
irrational” standard would not have destroyed the extremely narrow 
standard of judicial review of arbitration awards already established, but 
would allow for an award not based in reason to be vacated.197 
The Supreme Court must resolve these issues in the near future in 
order to maintain the arbitration process as a viable alternative to 
litigation.  Until it does, losing parties will continue to congest court 
dockets petitioning courts to vacate arbitration awards when they are 
dissatisfied with the results of arbitration.  Most importantly, a system of 
strict uniformity in reviewing arbitration awards must be adopted by the 
Supreme Court in order to preserve the integrity of the arbitration 
process and allow for a “pitch (award) so far outside the strike zone”198 
to be overturned by a reviewing court. 
Tracy Lipinski 
                                                                                                                                 
 
 194. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra notes 156-84 and accompanying text. 
 198. Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 594 (9th Cir. 2000).  See supra note 107. 
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